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ABSTRACT
FORMATION OF U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ECONOMIC FOREIGN
POLICY FOR THE OCCUPATION OF POSTWAR GERMANY,
1939-1948
by

Rick Jeffers

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Winson Chu

This study examines how a firm belief in the economic doctrine of multilateralism
triggered a powerful policy-determining crusade within the U.S. State Department. This
doctrine was fundamental to the establishment of postwar foreign policy toward
Germany. It was present in 1939 during early planning meetings and lasted through to the
1948 division of Germany. The equitable application of multilateralism as a basis for
foreign policy determination was not initially accepted by other sectors of the U.S.
Government; but over the course of this period State Department officials were able to
overcome intergovernmental resistance. Motives for postwar planning for Germany were
based on concerns over the growth of economic nationalism, which had led to a dramatic
decrease in international commerce during the 1930s. This paper follows the web of
multilateral foreign policy implementation as it weaves it way through the early planning
process, interdepartmental disagreements, severe problems during the military
occupation, and finally an impasse with the Soviets over occupied Germany.
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Introduction

At the dawn of the twentieth century, Germany stood at the hub of a delicate
commercial trade network that covered much of the world. World War One and, even
more so, the Great Depression had shaken that structure until the final calamity struck in
1939, leaving a world barren and defaced. The post-WWII effort to rebuild this
multilateral trade network was spearheaded by the US State Department. Their effort was
unique; it called for a concerted large-scale effort by a victorious United States to partner
with its wartime allies and drastically expand the international trading system with the
intent of creating prosperity for all. Even the defeated nations were to be included. In the
past, military victories were usually followed by empire, imperialism, colonization,
Balkanization, or retribution. US State Department officials planned for a different
future; they believed that the reconstruction of the victorious nations could not be
separated from reconstruction of their wartime enemies. National borders would be
unable to restrain postwar reconstruction, and Germany and Japan would need to play a
pivotal role in a world system of multilateral trade.
The peace and prosperity of the second half of the twentieth century were at stake,
and the United States had no choice but to take a leading role. The 1945 to 1949
occupation period was a difficult one, but by 1950, West Germany and Western Europe
were well on the way to full economic recovery. The constructive achievement of this
accomplishment had its foundation in the 1930s with a group of individuals centered at
the US State Department, under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his
chief economist, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky. They pursued an unyielding effort to use the power
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of the US economy to construct a capitalist world economic system based on multilateral
cooperation rather than economic nationalism. This paper demonstrates how by 1940 a
resolute foreign policy consensus had developed at the US State Department and how
officials sought to create a multilateral, free-market, free-trade scheme on an international
stage. It was anticipated that this policy would eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring
depression and foster prosperity for the United States and others during the postwar
period.
US occupation policy toward Germany was complex and unique. State
Department officials who formulated policy for the German postwar period had to
struggle with interdepartmental disagreements, make changes to resolve difficult
circumstances in Europe, and react to perceptions of Soviet expansionism. However,
from 1939–1949, this multilateral economic outlook was the keystone of US foreign
policy. During negotiations for the occupation of Germany, this policy was pursued
aggressively by State Department officials and eventually overcame challenging policy
schemes from the Treasury, War, and Executive branches. State Department multilateral
economic policy had far-reaching effects on the German occupation and was consistent
with the long-term US State Department goal of creating a multilateral world of free–
markets and free–trade.
The policy originating in 1939 by the early postwar planners at the US State
Department rested on the principle of multilateral economic cooperation among nations.
It was a single thread that led through a tangled web of US global strategy stretching
from 1939 to 1948. Their concept was based on multilateral trade; that is, trade between
groups of nations whose exports and imports are not in balance between two nations but
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whose balance of payments will likely find equilibrium in regard to trade with all nations.
This trade usually conforms to comparative advantages in which countries attempt to buy
imports at the cheapest price and sell exports at a premium price.1 Over the course of the
1939 to 1948 period, this multilateral concept became second nature among State
Department officials, and eventually, the consensus of the US government and military
establishment.2 By 1948, because of its powerful economic position, the United States
had the ability to set many of the rules for the postwar international commercial system.
Being in the position of an occupier of Germany, the United States was able to use the
potentially strong German industrial economy as leverage in Europe, around which
multilateral connections could be based.
Large financial interests in the United States started to recognize the importance
of European-US economic interaction soon after WWI. Prosperity during the 1920s
coincided with a redevelopment of US exports to Europe. Instability in Europe in the
1930s coincided with the depression and a dramatic reduction in international commerce.
The Dawes plan of 1924 was at its heart a concerted effort by a group of private US
investors lead by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company to make capital available to
Europe through loans to Germany, with the intention of invigorating international
commerce.3 During the interwar period, leading capitalists on both sides of the Atlantic
were troubled by each other’s actions. The development of National Socialism in
Germany during the 1930s presented itself to financial elites in the United States as

1

David W. Pearce, ed., The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics: 4th Edition, fourth edition edition
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1992), 292.
2
Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations.
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1972, 1972), 227.
3
Maurizio Vaudagna, The Role of the United States in the Reconstruction of Italy and West Germany,
1943-1949: Papers Presented at a German-Italian Colloquium Held at the John F. Kennedy-Institut Für
Nordamerikastudien, Berlin, June 1980, 8.
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autarchic and ruthless. They believed that Nazism could not exist without a German
industrial elite whose actions stoked the fires of fervent economic nationalism; this was a
threat to the expansion of American free enterprise.4 The German Nazi party saw the
United States, not the Soviets, as their chief long-term economic antagonist. They had
little respect for the Soviets or the British as a world force and saw the eventual
confrontation in terms of a German nationalist economy coming in opposition to a USlead world economy.5 The outbreak of war in 1939 preempted an international economic
showdown between the German and US versions of international commerce. The ability
of the US industrial economy to produce an unlimited volume of armaments to supply its
WWII allies suggests that Hitler may have realized that he had better odds by striking
quickly with his military on the European continent, rather than risking the eventuality of
a long-term economic showdown with the United States on a worldwide stage.

Historiography
The historiography addressing postwar economic policy planning follows a
multiple series of debates, the most prominent of which concerns the role of the United
States in the economic recovery of Europe. When historians who write about this period
are defined as traditional or revisionist, it often refers to their position on the contribution
of the United States to the economic recovery of Europe. A traditional historian would
assign a great deal of credit to the United States for European economic recovery. A
revisionist would assign only a minimal benefit to the United States. This would also
hold true for the recovery of Germany. A traditionalist would assign a great deal of value

4
5

Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 69.
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to the US occupation policy. For example, substantial credit would be given to the United
States for limiting reparation payments from Germany, enacting currency reform, and
integrating Germany into the European Recovery Program (ERP). There are a number of
revisionists who give the United States modest credit for European recovery but, as a
direct result of the occupation, give the United States considerable credit for West
German recovery.
A second major historiographical debate centers on the division of Germany into
East and West. A traditional view would place the blame predominately on the Soviets; a
revisionist would place a significant amount of blame on the United States. Other
historical debates can be recognized. There is a difference of opinion as to whether US
policy toward occupied Germany was driven by economic or political goals. There is also
a debate as to whether or not the problems encountered in the immediate aftermath of the
war were due to a US State Department preoccupation with long-term planning while
overlooking the need for short-term planning.
One of the best early accounts of US policy is Economic Planning for the Peace,
written by E.F. Penrose in 1953. This study focuses on the 1940 to 1947 period, but
Penrose does address US policy developments in the early 1950s. Penrose wrote his
account as an insider; he worked with Dr. Isaiah Bowman on postwar planning until 1941
when he was appointed economic advisor to John Gilbert Winant, the US Ambassador to
the United Kingdom.6 Penrose is considered a traditionalist as he points to the ERP as
being the boldest, most imaginative, and successful international policy measure ever
taken by the United States. He described the conditions in Europe in 1947 as a crisis; this
determination is a key factor in differentiating a traditionalist from a revisionist. Most
6

E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 8.
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historians who wrote close to this period never questioned their assertion that 1947 was a
year of crisis in Germany and Europe. By the 1980s, with the release of financial
documentation from the period, revisionist historians who studied empirical data from the
postwar period assert that 1947 was not a year of crisis. These historians point to
economic data that shows a consistent recovery starting as early as 1945. To Penrose and
other traditional historians, 1947 was undoubtedly a year of crisis; therefore, the recovery
post-1947 constituted a dramatic improvement.7
In his 1984 book, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, Allen S.
Milward, a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, bases his argument
on the conviction that 1947 was not a year of crisis. He acknowledges there were
difficulties in 1947 but that they were just the result of economic growing pains.
Milward, a leading revisionist, asserts that economic growth was well under way by 1947
and that the ERP had no overall dramatic effect on European recovery. For Milward, the
difficulties of 1947 arose because economic growth was too fast. European nations were
suffering from a poor balance of payments, namely a dollar gap. This condition was
caused by a Bretton Woods agreement that was not comprehensive enough to handle the
postwar financial needs of Europe.8 Milward makes use of numerous charts, showing
how nation-by-nation the upward growth curve of production was continuous from 1945
on. This was true for every nation except Germany, whose recovery was taking place at a
much slower pace. Milward identifies the German recovery as being different than others
in Europe and lists the absence of Germany trade from the European economy as one of

7

Ibid., 352.
Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984), 465.
8
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the difficulties in 1947.9 Possibly the best response to Milward’s claim was made by
William Diebold Jr. in his 1988 article “The Marshall Plan in Retrospect.” Diebold, a
Director of Economic Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), points out that
Milward’s assertion—that 1947 was not a crisis—is not credible because it goes against
what everyone in Europe thought at the time.10 Perhaps the most abundant source for a
traditional narrative that 1947 was a year of crisis comes directly from US State
Department documentation. This primary source material continuously refers to 1947 as a
year of crisis, and views the post-1947 recovery as dramatic.
A third version of historical events can be seen in John H. Backer’s 1978 book,
The Decision to Divide Germany. Backer served under General Clay in the economics
section of the occupational government and went on to become Clay’s biographer.
Backer sees himself as neither a traditionalist nor a revisionist. He claims there was no
grand design pursued by the US State Department, nor did he see any evidence of a long
range Soviet design for conquest. He suggests that the Soviets were exhausted, close to
starvation, and in great need of assistance. For Backer, US foreign policy was decisive in
Germany, but not in the form of a grand design. He saw policy development as
incremental, small steps developed in real time to deal with the immediate situation at
hand. He gives a detailed account of more than fifteen decisions, starting with the
weakening of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in 1945 to the currency reform of 1948,
all leading eventually to the division of Germany.11 This version directly challenges an
earlier book written by Bruce Kuklick in 1972 titled American Policy and the Division of
9
William Diebold Jr., “The Marshall Plan in Retrospect: A Review of Recent Scholarship,” Journal of
International Affairs 41, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 430.
10
Ibid., 431.
11
John H Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), 173.
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Germany. A professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Kuklick espoused a thesis
similar to the argument that I make in this paper, namely that there was a multilateral
consensus—a grand design—that was economic in nature and became second nature to
diplomats at the State Department. Kuklick asserts that the American commitment to
multilateralism demanded free markets and an aggressive economic stance. This ideology
became central to US policy in occupied Germany and was directly responsible for the
development of US-Soviet antagonisms. The United States was unwilling to concede to
reparations and other economic issues because of its commitment to multilateralism, and
it was this firm stance that lead to the division of Germany and, ultimately, the Cold
War.12
Another significant contribution to this study was The West German Economy
1945–1955 written in 1991 by Alan Kramer, a professor of European History at Trinity
College in Dublin. Kramer discounts the value of the ERP for the economic revival of
Germany. His main argument is that Germany was poised to expand rapidly as soon as
world trade revived. Allied bombing did not shatter the West German industrial
economy. Economic recovery began in 1945 and developed as part of a European trade
bloc, not an American style multilateral world system.13 This is a similar position to what
was taken by Milward; the resumption of trade for Germany came about as a result of a
German-French connection combining to form an interdependent European system.
German reentry into the West European economy had to wait until it became acceptable
to the Europeans and was not the result of US foreign policy.14 Kramer and Milward both
maintain that the difficulty the United States had in reaching a mutual agreement with
12

Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 6.
Alan Kramer, West German Economy, 1945-1955, First Edition (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991), 226.
14
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 491.
13
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European nations on ERP policy revealed how far apart the economic objectives of the
separate nations were and that the redevelopment of European postwar trade favored the
nationalistic interest of each separate nation, not an integrated mutual benefit to the
group. Revisionist historians do give the ERP some credit for helping West Germany
return to the European market. Postwar West Germany, unlike other ERP participants,
was in no position to object to interference by the United States in its national
sovereignty, and at the time, was in critical need of US funding for import materials. Both
Milward and Kramer acknowledge that the ERP had a positive effect on the return of
commercial trade to Germany, and because of its weakened condition it was more than
willing to receive aid.15
The debate over the effects of short-term policy versus long-policy on the
restoration of the German economy has been the cause of another rift amongst historians.
Penrose blames the problems faced in Germany from 1945 to 1947 on the failure by the
United States to develop an effective short-term policy. Preparation of long-term policy
by the US State Department was well conceived and would have prevented the economic
disaster of the interwar period in a reconstructed world. Penrose maintains that because
Germany was in such a weak position in 1945, the long-term multilateral free trade
policy pursuit of the US State Department was unrealistic. The economic errors of
postwar planning were the omissions of preparation for short-term emergencies that arose
in the immediate aftermath of the war. Penrose puts most of the blame for this omission
on the interference of the Treasury Department in 1944.16 This position is similar to the
position held by Backer, and would seem to hold a significant amount of weight as both

15
16

Ibid., 471.
Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, 360.
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Penrose and Backer were in Europe at the time working on this problem. Penrose did see
a value in the long-term planning done by the State Department, whereas Backer believed
that the most important policy decisions were made at lower levels and prompted by
immediate necessity. Backer saw little value in the long-term planning made by the US
State Department for the German recovery.17
The main argument of this thesis is that the motivation behind State Department
policy towards Germany was primarily economic with political motivations becoming
secondary. Kuklick says something very similar. He frames the US commitment to
economic multilateralism in an ideology that would serve the interests of the United
States and all other nations. Multilateralism developed around a consensus that a
country’s economic institutions determine both its political institutions and the
psychology of its citizens.18 This stands in contrast to how Milward describes the
motivation behind State Department policy. Milward states that US policy was
formulated primarily for political objectives and only used economic policy as a
mechanism.19 Milward saw the aim of the ERP to create a political institution, the United
States of Europe. It seems to me that Kuklick’s argument is closer to the truth. Milward
bases his ideas about US motivations on empirical data from European sources and
comes to a conclusion about US State Department motives that is not substantiated by
State Department documentation. Officials at the State Department talked to a certain
extent about a politically integrated United Europe, but the overwhelming evidence from
US State Department documents seems to point to a US foreign policy consensus that

17

Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, IX.
Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 3.
19
Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 5.
18
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was determined to rebuild a European commercial system by using economic policy to
create economic results with political benefits coming as a byproduct.
Historians like Bruce Kuklick, by advancing a theory that events like the division
of Germany and the start of the Cold War were caused by a US foreign policy based on a
firm belief in multilateralism, are considered part of a more extreme branch of the
revisionist school.20 It essentially suggests that Western economic theory favors
multilateralism and that US State Departments motivations were driven by a belief that a
worldwide system of trade would benefit everyone involved. Evidence of this can be seen
in the willingness of early postwar planners to include everyone, including the Soviets, in
its commercial trade plans. It was not until 1947 when the Soviets rejected
multilateralism that political divisions were established. I do not completely agree with
Kuklick, who seems to think that multilateralism was universally accepted by all US
government agencies from the start. Kuklick maintains that Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau Jr., by promoting the Morgenthau Plan for the harsh treatment of
Germany, was advancing a multilateral policy. Morgenthau believed that depressing the
German economy would enhance British foreign trade. This may have been what
Morgenthau believed, but it is not multilateralism. This thesis argues that the Treasury
Department did not promote multilateralism. Their attempt to promote harsh treatment
for Germany and advance an inadequate Bretton Woods Agreement were weak attempts
to repair the conditions of the interwar period, not drive the postwar world toward an
expanded prosperity. Kuklick seems to apply multilateralism broadly to all US
government departments. This thesis presents a distinction, multilateralism was a policy
first developed at the State Department that had to overcome opposition from the
20

Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, 174.
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Treasury Departments and other branches of the US government before it later became
accepted as a consensus by most US government agencies.
Primary Sources
The primary documentation for this paper comes from the Foreign Relations of
the United States Collection (FRUS), published by the US State Department. The original
State Department documentation has been digitized and is available at the University of
Wisconsin Digital Collections center. It consists of official documentation of all major
foreign policy decisions that have been declassified for publication. The FRUS collection
begins in 1861 with the Lincoln administration and runs through 1960. Produced by the
US State Department Office of the Historian, it includes documents from various
Presidential libraries, internal memoranda, documents from the State and War (Defense)
Departments, and private papers from those involved in the creation of foreign policy.
The framework for this paper was built around FRUS documentation from 1939 to 1948
relevant to the development and implementation of postwar economic policy toward
Germany. Also included as primary source materials were speeches and publications
from US government economists and diplomatic officials involved in the creation of
policy toward postwar Germany. Finally, official publications from the Council of
Foreign Relations and its members from 1939–1942 were included as essential parts of
the first half of this paper. Throughout the ten years covered by this paper, there was a
substantial turnover of department officials whose input affected policy decisions. For
example, starting in 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his staff were at the center
of policy development; Hull was then succeeded by Edward Stettinius Jr., James F.
Burns, and George C. Marshall, respectively. In general, the group of State Department
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officials in charge of policy in 1948 was a completely different group than those who
started the process in 1939.
Chapter Summaries and Related Secondary Sources
Chapter I, 1939: An Assessment of Risk and Opportunity, offers an assessment of
the world economic situation as WWII approaches. Discussion focuses on the breakdown
of the international trade by the introduction of trade restrictions and the growth of
economic nationalism. Prewar economic warfare on the European continent is discussed
as an unavoidable reaction by totalitarian leaders to US trade policy, including Hitler’s
seemingly sensible economic approach to rebuild German international commerce. US
documentation shows concerns about the development of Germany’s postwar plan for
“New Order” in a Nazi dominated Europe, a nationalist system of international
commerce at odds with US commercial interest. Authors like Vera Micheles Dean and
Paul Enzig add to the narrative about the development of German economic nationalism.
Starting in 1939, early postwar planners at the US State Department studied how the
United States would have to react to the economic challenges of a European economy
controlled from Berlin. As the military situation on the European continent changed, the
US State Department had to also change policy formation and consider the implications
and opportunities of an Allied victory. The State Department turned to a group of
advisors who developed a unique plan based on a set of core economic principles
designed to reassemble international trade to eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring
depression.
Chapter II, 1939–1944: Early Postwar Planning, describes how two agencies—
one governmental, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies, and one private,
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the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—linked together to formulate postwar policy.
They agreed on a strategy and a purpose that was driven by economic prosperity for all,
including the defeated Germans. Three State Department policy papers are examined in
detail: Percy W. Bidwell authors a proposal for postwar German commercial policy,
Arthur Gayer and Alvin Hansen author a proposal for industrial cartels, and Diebold
offers a proposal for postwar reparations. Although a general consensus was reached, the
committee members were not in complete agreement. Isaiah Bowman and Sumner
Welles, two influential committee members, came close to splitting the committee over
proposals concerning the postwar division of Germany. Starting in August of 1944 the
policy recommendations advanced by the postwar planners at the State Department was
beginning to run into substantial resistance from officials at the US Treasury Department.
Chapter III, 1944–1945: Interdepartmental Struggle, covers intervention by the
Treasury Department and the Executive Branch in State Department planning. 1944 was
the start of a five-year campaign by the State Department to implement its multilateral
free trade policy as the dominant feature of postwar Germany economic framework. This
chapter looks at the development of a rivalry between State and Treasury over the general
direction of postwar global commercial policy and examines how this would affect
Germany. Harry Dexter White, a senior official at the Treasury Department
recommended a twofold postwar policy agenda, a punitive approach to postwar
Germany, and a commercial policy that was aimed at fixing the problems of the interwar
commercial trading system. Meanwhile, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky and his colleagues at the
State Department developed a more dynamic proposal to infuse the postwar world with
an expansive prosperity that was to include Germany. The end result was a policy victory
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for the Treasury Department, putting the State Department at a severe disadvantage at the
start of the occupation. After losing this interdepartmental struggle, the effort to
implement the vision of early postwar planners would be passed to a new group of State
Department officials who kept the dreams of a prosperous multilateral world alive.
Chapter IV, 1945–1948: The Occupation Period, covers the occupation period
immediately after the war and examines how policy evolved from a punitive JCS1067
directive issued in 1945 to a policy that by 1947 was promoting German prosperity. An
important focus of this chapter is the misguided policy planning by all agencies of the US
government in dealing with the realities of a postwar occupation. During this period, the
State Department had to work closely with the occupation officials at the War
Department, most notably, General Lucius Clay, head of US occupation forces. Clay’s
writings and military publications are examined, as they deal with a deteriorating
situation.
Chapter V, 1947–1948: An Integrated West Germany, looks at how the
commitment of the US State Department to a multilateral economy recovery affected the
division of Germany and its return to prosperity. By 1947, the US State department was
returning to a position of power in the development of occupation policy. The situation in
Germany was becoming desperate and it appeared there was no good solution. There was
little policy cooperation between the United Sates and the Soviets, and negotiations
concerning economic and national unity issues were going nowhere. This chapter draws
heavily on State Department documentation from the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) headed
by George Kennan. The European Recovery Plan (ERP) developed under the direction of
Kennan, became the State Department recipe for problems in Germany and Europe. After

16
it was unable to resolve the problem of German reunification with the Soviets, the US
State Department turned to an aggressive economic policy, using ERP funding to set up a
multilateral commercial system in the non-Soviet controlled portion of Europe.
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Chapter I
1939: An Assessment of Risk and Opportunity
The Growth of Economic Nationalism
The Great Depression of 1929 was a key turning point for the twentieth century.
Economic insecurity during the interwar period was the result of escalating
unemployment, increasing amounts of international debt, and insurmountable tariff
barriers. The onset of the Great Depression not only reversed any positive aspects of the
1920s, but also severely compounded ominous trends that were developing in
international commerce. As a result of this instability, significant counter forces took root
at this time the revolutionary outlook of communism—a general contempt for the
precepts of Christianity—and the failure of democracy to contend with economic distress.
Loyalty and unity among nation-states were becoming progressively degraded.1 The
United States and other major powers routinely practiced nationalistic economic policies
while international loans and increasing tariff barriers had suicidal effects on
international commerce. Commercial trade among nations was drastically reduced to
levels far below pre-WWI totals.2 As this trend continued, nations increasingly turned to
extreme nationalism.

1

Harley A. Notter, United States, and Department of State., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 19391945, Department of State Publication; 3580. General Foreign Policy Series; 15. (Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print Off., 1949), 8.
2
Ibid., 9.
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By 1933, the international system of trade and finance was crippled. Europe was
in significant international debt and no positive steps were being taken to remedy the
situation. Astronomical sums were being assessed on WWI reparation accounts. Even if a
robust amount of international trade had existed, it still would have taken a massive effort
to liquidate the magnitude of war debt and reparation payments that had accumulated.
The situation was different for the United States than it was for Europe. As a creditor
nation, the United States was able to provide large loans to foreign nations; this lending
allowed the United States to maintain a high export level while restricting imports with
the use of tariff barriers. Consequently, a significant portion of the United States lending
to European nations was used to cover the debt owed.3 The continued lending from the
United States only served to further destabilize the international commercial system.
The interwar period was dominated by a steady growth of exaggerated
protectionism. Because of the reduced volume of international commerce, debtor nations,
like Germany, could not generate enough trade income from which to meet their
obligations. Trade restrictive policies by creditor nations, like the United States,
perpetuated this international imbalance.4 The United States assumed the responsibility
for starting the process in 1922 with the enactment of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. By
the mid-1920s, Europe, especially Germany, responded with its own protectionist tariffs.
Then, in 1930, the United States compounded trade obstacles with the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff.5 Over the course of the interwar period, greater obstacles were being placed in the
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way of imports. As a consequence, the total volume of international commerce was in
steep decline, much lower before WWII than it was before WWI.
International support for high tariff polices and poorly conceived international
loans spread poverty and despair at a time when the world was looking to the United
States leadership.6 Nations practiced economic discrimination with complete disregard
for others. Foreign trade was considered a cutthroat game open for each nation to profit
by taking advantage of its neighbor. In the US, an isolationist sentiment had taken control
over national policy. The US contribution to these “beggar-thy-neighbor” polices caused
lower living standards in nations around the world. American private investors
perpetuated the problem by making irresponsible loans to debtor nations. During the
1920s, the United States became the world’s largest creditor nation. Much of the money
borrowed by nations was used to purchase US exports or to pay back loans owed to the
US government. Loans made to Germany, in particular, were part of a circular scheme;
borrowed money was being used by Germany to make reparation payments to US WWI
allies who, in turn, would use the same money to make war debt repayments back to the
United States. At the same time, these countries’ exports were being purged from the US
market because of the US’ high tariff environment denying them much needed trade
revenue.7 The international trade barrier problem was further compounded in 1932 by the
introduction of the Ottawa agreements. British Commonwealth nations, as a reaction to
US tariff policy, set up a zone of imperial trade preferences amongst themselves.
International trade with Canada, Australia, India, South America, and other British
Commonwealth nations was severely limited because of heightened trade barriers
6
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established within the Commonwealth.8 In an era of deteriorating international
cooperation, extremist nationalist political solutions were gaining popularity. Nations,
like Germany, for which economic prowess should have been able to provide a stable and
prosperous standard of living for its citizens were mired in economic distress.
The growth of international commerce was also restrained during the interwar
period by the expanded use of industrial cartels. Unlike in the United States where cartels
were viewed with animosity, European nations increasingly developed cartel
arrangements to gain control over targeted markets. The proliferation and popularity of
industrial cartels was not limited to Germany. The division of world markets is always a
critical element of any cartel agreement; the goal of an arrangement is to eliminate import
competition and to inhibit the growth of domestic industries. For example, in February
1939, at a meeting in Düsseldorf, Germany, the Federation of British Industries arranged
with the German Reichsgruppe Industrie to divide Latin American markets in a
coordinated effort to drive out other exporters. Also, during the 1930s, IG Farben and
other British industries united to create dumping zones in South America to drive out
other importers and eliminate domestic competition.9 European industrial cartel policy
threatened US export industries and prevented the growth of domestic industries in Latin
America. By the late 1930s, the tide of economic nationalism was overtaking any
pragmatic approach to the liberalization of international commercial policy as European
nations increasingly turned to cartel arrangements.
In this tragic era, the most significant effort to reverse the fatal protectionist trend
was started in 1932 by the new US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Secretary Hull, from
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the beginning of his term, was an unwavering free trader. With the support of the
Roosevelt administration, Secretary Hull actively sought to reduce US tariff barriers. His
method involved bypassing the need for Senate ratification by making use of bilateral
agreements with multiple nations.10 With the implementation of reciprocal trade
agreements negotiated by the executive branch, he started the process of reducing tariffs,
quotas, and import restrictions. Basing US policy on the widest application of “mostfavored-nation” status, he sought to eliminate discriminatory commercial trade policy.11
Secretary Hull’s effort to expand international commerce was in jeopardy throughout the
1930s as other nations increasingly continued their move toward extreme protectionist
economies.
German Policy and Economic War
By the late 1930s, international commerce had moved beyond beggar-thyneighbor protectionism to a state of economic totalitarianism. The United States had to
adapt to an international atmosphere that to a great extent had become outside of its
reach. Terms, such as economic warfare, autarky, and economic totalitarianism, were
being used to describe the policy pursuits of Germany and its allies. These designations
communicated a hyper-aggressive form of commercial policy that became detrimental to
human welfare.12 The obstruction of international trade by excessive barriers served to
fortify German prosperity into a self-defined zone. By rigid regimentation of the trade
process, drastic selection of imports, and aggressive policies toward weaker countries,
Germany made the substantially reduced volume of international commerce serve the
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needs of its rearmament program.13 The economic autarchy practiced by Germany at this
time bred international conflict, animosity, and ill will.
Autarchy found its roots in the distinction between national economies and world
economies. Various historians, commentators, and economists have sought to rationalize
Germany’s aggressive economic policies by claiming that the German system, based on
autarchy, developed a distinctive set of characteristics of its own that differed from that
of US and other Western capitalist systems. In his book Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe,
Paul Einzig contended that German commercial policy differed from other Western
nations because the common notion of an international division of labor was never
popular in Germany. Much of German economic thought developed as an antithesis to
Adam Smith-type laissez-faire principles. For Germany, the concept of an international
division of labor enabling a free and open international exchange conflicted with
tendencies toward a German “national system.”14 In the nineteenth century, German
economist Friedrich List developed an economic theory involving a national system that
opposed absolute free trade, which meant that every country should produce at home all
of the goods necessary for its national security. Since the closing decades of the
nineteenth century, German statesmen had practiced List’s doctrine; a number of
economically unjustifiable industries were developed for purely military considerations.15
Since the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933, the German national system of autarchy and
economic warfare had been executed to an extreme.

13
Leo Pasvolsky, The United States in the World Economy, 1940 Some Aspects of Our Foreign Economic
Policy, Department of State. Publication,; No. 1595; Commercial Policy Series,; (Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1941), 22.
14
Paul Einzig, Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe. (London, Macmillan, 1941), 102.
15
Ibid., 104.

23
Although Germany had achieved technical maturity, some question if it had
achieved political and social maturity. In his book The Struggle for World Order,
Micheles Dean argued that because the Germans, unlike the French and English, had
failed to achieve national unity until relatively recently, they remained outside the
mainstream of Western social and political development. In the 1930s, Germany had the
outward appearance of a modern state with up-to-date industrial techniques, but it really
belonged to a different formation than that of Western Europe. Politically, Germany was
still living in the sixteenth century. Germany, because of its belated union, failed to share
in the social and political developments that formed the Western European tradition.16
Because of this lack of social and political development, Germany was unable properly
integrate in the Western world economy.
Some historians identified certain groups like industrial leaders or the Junkers for
the creation of German nationalist polices. In his article “Postwar Controls of the German
Economy,” Percy W. Bidwell, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assigned a
considerable amount of responsibility for Germany’s aggressive economic policy to the
Junker class. Bidwell acknowledged that it would be an obvious overstatement to assign
the Junker class sole responsibility for economic warfare; however, the Junkers, together
with their industrial counterparts, were largely responsible for Germany’s high protective
trade policy since 1879.17
The best way to clarify the motivations that drove European economic
nationalism is to look at the statements made by the European heads of state. In February
1940, President Roosevelt sent Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe on a
16
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fact-finding mission. Welles was assigned to meet with German, Italian, and other
European leaders to ascertain if grounds for a peaceful settlement existed. Two important
topics of discussion were that of international commercial policy and the Roosevelt
administration’s attempt to lower world trade barriers.
Statements made by Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Mussolini put into perspective the
economic environment of the time. Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, and German Foreign
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop made it clear in discussions with Welles that they
blamed both the United States and Great Britain for starting a tariff war. As Mussolini
expressed, there was no greater discrimination policy than what was found in the Ottawa
Agreements or the tariff policy pursued by the United States before the start of the
Roosevelt Administration. Mussolini further stated that Italy was the last major country
to enter into an autarchic system and did so solely as a last resort. Italian policy was
developed as a self–defense mechanism after being confronted by large trade obstructions
established by the United States and Great Britain.18 The Italian leader unmistakably
described the United States as the first aggressor against the freedom of international
commerce.
Welles’s then visited Germany to meet with Hitler’s inner circle to discuss
international commerce, among other things. At this time, Nazi Germany was not overly
concerned about the development of trade on a global scale, but it did aggressively
pursue strict control over its European market. Hitler had a different perspective than
Mussolini; he explained to Welles that unrestricted international trade was not the cure
for the world’s economic problems. Because of the industrial nature of both the US and
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German productions, it would be better for Germany to intensify its trade relations with
countries in Central and Southeastern Europe. 19 Hitler stipulated that Germany would
benefit more from increased trade within the European continent because its immediate
neighbors had a greater need for German industrial products than the United States.
Welles countered Hitler’s argument by pointing out that the standard of living was too
low in Southeastern Europe to make German industrial trade profitable. Industrial trade
between Germany and the United States would be more advantageous for both parties.20
This argument did not impress German leadership; they believed that challenging the
United States at this time on a global level would not have been productive.
Consolidation of their position in Europe would be the best policy for Germany interests.
In a private conversation with Ribbentrop, Welles took the opportunity to outline
the current US position on international commercial policy as developed by Secretary
Hull. Welles explained that so long as Germany pursued its present autarchic policy and
made use of every form of tariff discrimination, there would be no opportunity for the
United States to improve relations with Germany.21 The development of a sound liberal
trade policy was the only way for the world to retreat from economic warfare and return
to a state of economic recovery.22
By 1939, the military buildup had completely changed the nature of German
commercial policy. Trade regimentation and narrow bilateralism was implemented not
for economic reasons but for the purpose of rearmament. Market forces did not drive
German import decisions. The purpose of Germany’s highly selective trade process was
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to maximize importation of the materials needed for armaments.23 This policy would be
unsustainable over a long period without some type of forceful action on Germany’s part.
As Germany’s demands for resources from its European neighbors grew so did their
resentment. To pay for the large amounts of imported raw material and equipment,
Germany used a type of enforced credit designation—a system of blocked marks that
represented enforced loans to Germany by the countries from which it made its
purchases. As time passed, Germany began to encounter greater difficulties in the
operation of its trading system. Its trading partners became increasingly resistant to
German policy of enforced credit and the large amounts of commodities it required.24 As
more time passed, Germany needed to be even more forceful in its dealing with its
neighbors.
As the 1930s were coming to an end, Germany’s trade policy was drastically
unstable. Germany had trouble reaching its desired trade levels, exporting only about half
of what it had ten years earlier. In 1938, Germany’s export level was only 59% of its
1929 level, whereas Great Britain’s exports had reached 74% of its 1929 level, and the
US reached 79% of its 1929 export level. Germany’s international trade system was
becoming unsustainable. The long-term result of this policy was the requirement of
increasing the use of coercion with its trading neighbors to gain the resources it desired.
Thanks to the Anschluss and Hitler’s raiding of Austrian gold and foreign reserves in the
Austrian National bank, Germany was able to get thru 1938 by ruining a 450 million
Reichsmark trade defect.25 This was only a temporary fix, as by 1939 Germany was back

23

Pasvolsky, The Problem of Economic Peace after the War., 13.
Ibid.
25
Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy / Adam Tooze.
(London/ New York, Allen Lane, 2006), 246.
24

27
to running balance of payments deficits. This problem was highlighted by Hitler’s
announcement in 1938 that “Germany must either export or die.”26 As Dr. Leo Pasvolsky,
Special Assistant to Secretary of State Hull, explained in his 1942 US State Department
publication “The Problem of Economic Peace after the War,” whether German leaders
looked at their commercial policy in the 1930s as being permanent was debatable, but it
was clear that Germany’s trade policy had a powerful impact on the disruption of
European trade relations.27 It seemed that in 1939, war had arrived just in time to save
Germany’s economy from this critical trade imbalance.
In addition to an aggressive trade policy, Germany also promoted a strong
international cartel arrangement that aggravated and prolonged international commercial
relations. Industrial cartels caused dangerous security and political consequences by
promoting the power of the German state. By controlling large portions of regional
markets, German cartels raised prices at will, restricted output, and kept out newcomers.28
German industrial cartels raised the price of coal, steel, and cement while the economy
was experiencing a recession. For example, in 1929, the price levels in markets controlled
by cartels was 94% of 1926 levels, while the price levels in markets free from cartels
were 61% of the 1926 levels.29 German cartels also over-reserved its share of critical
products, like coal and steel, allowing Germany to become artificially self-sufficient.30
The exclusive domination of German industrial cartels over markets contributed to
poverty and increased economic tension in the region it controlled.
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The Economic Consequences of a German Victory
In the lead up to war, American policy planners were concerned that a German
victory in Europe would have dire consequences for the future of US economic
prosperity. Without an efficient and open international division of labor, there could be
no hope of avoiding the financial ruin of the Great Depression. Economists from both
sides of the developing conflict understood that to promote prosperity and to raise the
standard of living for their citizens, nations had to look beyond their borders to expand
trade. In considering the postwar possibilities, by 1939, US State Department officials
realized that Germany was eager to undertake the reorganization of European trade on
their terms.31 The question in 1939 was whether the future process of organizing Europe
into an efficient economic system would be done by the imposition of the German pattern
or a more inclusive version sought by Western democratic powers.32
How commercial policy was to be arranged in the post-WWII period depended on
the outcome of the war. Planners at the State Department considered whether a German
victory would dictate a continuation of pre-war heavy trade restrictions. They questioned
if Germany would retain its recent policy of aggressive self-sufficiency or eventually
return to balanced economic relationships. Early overwhelming victories of the
Wehrmacht in Western Europe required them to consider the consequences of a
permanent system of economic autarchy across the European continent.33 Most believed a
German-controlled Europe would likely result in a highly-centralized trade scheme with
Berlin as its focal point. In this case, the overall level of foreign commerce for the United
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States would likely decline and the United States might eventually have to adopt
German-type trading methods.34 The State Department planners started to look at other
regions around the world to fill in a perceived US trade gap.
Analysis done on the basis of a German victory showed that a future US
economic trading bloc would be forcefully separated from European commerce. State
Department analysts determined that a European Bloc controlled from Berlin would be
more prosperous and self-sufficient than a US Bloc comprised solely of the Western
Hemisphere. The United States without Europe would, at a minimum, have to integrate
considerable sections of the British Empire or Asia to maintain prosperity.35 The State
Department was unable to take any regions for granted, even the British Commonwealth.
As late as 1940, powerful elements in the British financial and industrial sectors believed
that the domination of Europe by Nazi Germany and the existence of the British
Commonwealth were not necessarily contradictory.36 State Department planners were
also particularly anxious about the possibility of German interference in the Western
Hemisphere.
In 1940, the capitulation of the Netherlands and the French request for an
armistice sparked US concerns about the possibility of German influence in Latin
America, specifically that European countries with possessions in the Caribbean would
have their territories transferred to Germany. The United States was also concerned that
some Latin American countries would become politically dependent on Germany. In June
1940, the United States notified Germany through its diplomats in Rome and Berlin that
34
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it would not accept the transfer of these territories to German control. State Department
officials were disturbed by a threatening and contentious German response.37 Although
Germany made it clear that they would not be intimidated by US concerns, for the
moment they were focused on Europe.
Hitler compared Germany’s position in Europe to the US position in the Western
Hemisphere. For the time being German economic interests would be best suited not by
unrestricted international trade but by taking up trade with its Eastern and Southern
neighbors.38 As a great industrial power, Germany was entitled to safeguard its interest.
Just as Latin America, quite legitimately, assured the position of the United States as a
world power, Germany was also entitled to its sphere of influence and controlling
position in Central Europe.39
A main economic objective of a victorious Germany in a postwar Europe was to
gain control over the heavy industries of the nations it occupied, putting German
monopolist’s influence at the head of the European economy. With German management
skill running the day-to-day operations, heavy industry would be the cornerstone of
fascist occupation policy. The Krupp firm would run the European coal and iron
industries under the direction of Herman Goring, the Flick firm under the direction of
Heinrich Himmler would operate the steel industry, and the Schmitz firm under the
direction of Joseph Goebbels would run the European chemical industry.40 State
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Department planners understood that the implications of a German controlled European
economy meant little opportunity for US interests.
American policymakers assumed that German postwar occupation economies
would be guided by the following five principles: (1) to take over the heavy industries in
occupied countries and put them under the control of German industrial cartels; (2) to
eliminate domestic consumption manufacturing or any local industry that would compete
with German firms; (3) to reorient new economies in occupied countries to
predominantly agricultural production with a close tie to the German chemical fertilizer
industry; (4) to develop the overall European financial policy to exclusively promote
heavy industry and to cut financing to local consumer industrial manufactures; and (5) to
limit the availability of capital, labor, and raw materials to local small businesses,
shopkeepers, and independent craftsman.41 Germany would dismantle most industries in
conquered areas and transfer their work to the Reich, eventually creating a Germany as a
super-industrialized workshop supported by an agriculturalized Europe.42 Germany felt
that it could sell this scheme to the European public as a new era of prosperity that would
put an end to the deprivation of the 1930s.
As war started to rage across the continent both the United States and Germany
began to develop plans for how Europe should be organized after the war. Both sides had
their own visions for the postwar period. In 1940, Germany proclaimed a “New Order”
for Europe by declaring that nations under German control would enjoy unprecedented
prosperity and an increase in the standard of living. Berlin promised that once British
resistance was overcome, there would be a new golden age for Europe. A reduction of
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personal freedoms in the occupied countries would be exchanged for a political and
economic stability.43 Nazi propaganda for the New Order promised the people of Europe
a comprehensive plan for recovery and expansion. Centralized economic planning and
finance would be extended over an entire German-controlled Europe. An expansionary
monetary policy with all non-German currencies stabilized and set in relation to the
Reichsmark, tied to a gold benchmark or to the dollar. Unemployment would cease to
exist by use of a continental-wide division of labor. There would be an extensive
rationalization on a continental scale under the direction of German cartels. Germany
would maintain a stable price level for agricultural production in Europe by fixing
commodity prices for long periods of time. All trade agreements would be negotiated
between continents with Europe operating as a unitary trade bloc. Finally, Europe would
internally become a free trade zone.44 The specific plan envisioned by Germany fit the
view of international commercial policy as explained by Hitler and Ribbentrop.
German economists had a different outlook on the international division of labor
than that of US economists. A German run division of labor on the continent of Europe
would be focused on German nationalist goals. Production would only be allowed if it
would result in a higher return for German industrial interests.45 Central planners in
Berlin would pursue German interest over those of its vassal states. Although German
propaganda claimed Europe would be a free trade zone, exports from occupied nations
would only be allowed if they did not compete with German industry.46 At times, vassal
states would be required to over-export to third party nation simply for Germany to get a
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quantity of a particular foreign exchange currency of which it was short. An international
division of labor did exist, but rather than operating for the needs of the market, it
operated for the needs of a German military industrial structure.
In early 1940, the German plan for “international commerce” in the immediate
aftermath of WWII was not yet completely agreed on by the Nazi leadership. But a main
objective included a system set up under a regional organization. The world would be
composed of continental economic systems divided by regions. British and American
financial interests would be excluded from the European continent. Europe would be
controlled by Germany, Africa split between German and Italian interests, and Asia
controlled by Japan. Russia and the Western Hemisphere would be left alone at this time.
The main objective was the creation of “Grossraumwirtschaft,” a European economy in
which Western financial interests would be excluded, while the flow of production would
be directed toward Germany.47 This was drastically different than the multilateral system
proposed by US planners in which the entire world would have equal access to markets
and resources.
The June 1941 invasion of Russia by Germany started to change the outlook of
US postwar planners about the prospect of a German victory. By 1942, State Department
planners started to believe that a German defeat was inevitable. This initiated both a
change in the direction and an intensification of planning. The long-term goal of a
multilateral world now started to seem like a definite possibility.48 A critical point of this
strategic change was the concept of unconditional surrender. Early in 1943, a decision
was made that would have major implications for postwar planning. Both Churchill and
47
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Roosevelt decided to accept nothing less than a policy of unconditional surrender.49 For
many Allied officials, the concept of postwar “economic security” became dependent on
Germany’s total capitulation.50 The German menace must be wiped out permanently
before the world can take a new contractual form.51 The Allied position seemed to
solidify over the course of the war; it was anticipated that at war’s end Germany would
not be in a position to refuse peace terms. The critical point was that there would be no
bargaining and that postwar terms would be “imposed unilaterally” at the total discretion
of the Allies.52 For the State Department, this was seen as a golden opportunity for the
United States to take on global responsibility at the end of WWII that it had refused to
accept after WWI.
The Allied position of unconditional surrender was a goal that was targeted at the
German leadership. At this early stage in the war, Roosevelt proclaimed that he felt no
individual animosity toward the German and Italian people. However, he was intent on a
complete change of their nationalistic systems. In August 1941, Welles quoted Roosevelt
as stating that it was of great importance that a point of assurance must be given to the
German and Italian peoples and that the British and the US governments desired to offer
them fair and equal opportunity of economic character after the war.53 It is not clear
whether this was just public posturing in the midst of war or if Roosevelt changed his
mind as the war dragged on. It seems that near the end of the war Roosevelt was saying
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something different, by 1945 he favored a policy that would teach all the German people
a lesson.
What Was at Stake for the Postwar Period?
The US Department of State felt that the people of the United States and other
nations must have a clear understanding of the stakes involved if the United States was to
follow the techniques that would develop a strong economic peace in the postwar
period.54 Wars are not fought for their own sake, but for the sake of determining which of
the protagonists will shape the peace that follows.55 As for the United States, the world
must be made aware that the United States is going to foster equality of economic
opportunity for all nations. The cessation of armed hostilities will not be followed by a
continuation of economic warfare on the basis of trade discrimination.
Postwar planners were aware that the world was watching how the United States
treated Germany. Men and women everywhere were searching for a new order. Their real
task was to define the democratic concept of the postwar order in such a way as to
convince people throughout the world, including the defeated nations, that a victory by
Western powers was their best chance for a period of economic prosperity and
reinvigorated democracy. It would be disastrous for the world if Europe returned to an
acute form of nationalism. US planners understood that at the end of the war that Britain
would not command the world influence it did in 1939, that France could not recapture a
position of European leadership, and that Russia could no longer be ostracized by the
world. The central question was the role of Germany and the pervasive feeling of most in
the State Department that the United States had the power to ensure that Germany would
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be an equal member of a multilateral world and not be reduced to a second rate nation,
even temporarily.56
State Department officials believed that comprehensive planning was necessary
and that it must be done early. A delay in planning would allow special interest and
pressure groups time to seek preferences for themselves and discrimination for others in
the postwar economy.57 The period following the war was as decisive as the war itself.
Allies could not pursue the same misguided policies of the past by waiting for a postwar
summit to set policy; the disastrous consequences of the post WWI era was to be avoided.
The State Department was committed to the notion that economic prosperity was the key
requirement for the establishment of an enduring peace. Postwar planners approached the
reconstruction of the world’s economy by taking into consideration the conditions that
caused recent wars. Events of the previous decade led officials to devote their foremost
attention to the relationship between foreign policy and economics. The coincidence of
world depression with the rise of dictators appeared more than accidental. US State
Department planners almost unanimously accepted the argument that economic distress
was a major cause of WWII. Their direction of thinking was dominated by determining
what measures could be undertaken to keep an economic depression from reoccurring.58
As Secretary Hull proclaimed, “A world in economic chaos would be forever a breeding
ground for trouble and war.”59 The State Department took this to heart and used this
notion as a cornerstone from which to build policy.
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By 1941, economists at the US State Department held firm in their position that it
was harmful to return to an international economic system based on small national units
struggling with each other for currency, raw materials, and markets, while striving to cut
each other out. They understood that the beggar-thy-neighbor policy of the 1930s hurt
everyone. US planners looked to the end of hostilities for the formation of larger
economic units calling for a greater measure of cooperation in trade in order to forgo a
resurgence of worldwide depression. A change of direction was required, creating larger
integrated markets and not a system of direct totalitarian interference in economic
affairs.60
Planning for the postwar period became public on January 6, 1941 when President
Roosevelt made his Four Freedoms speech. Even though classified planning had been
underway at the State Department since 1939, it was this speech by Roosevelt that set the
first public parameters for US postwar goals. President Roosevelt called for a world in
which all people would share freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from
want, and freedom from fear. From this date, human freedoms, including economic
security, were publicly proclaimed as a fundamental cornerstone of US postwar
planning.61 This speech significantly widened the basis for US foreign policy planning
beyond what was previously discussed at State Department meetings.
A State Department Consensus on How to Plan
As WWII started in August 1939, Secretary Hull felt that all pre-1939 methods of
preserving the peace were bankrupt; the United States had the ability and the burden to
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correct the mistakes of the past. The strength of the United States would put it into a
position to refute its internal isolationist sentiment and begin to take responsibility for
world leadership in the postwar period.62 More than a responsibility, the current conflict
presented itself to some US State Department officials as a grand opportunity for the
United States to emerge as the premier power after the war. American interventionists at
State were certain by 1939 that the conflict would involve the US and that prior
preparation was vital not only for military preparedness but also for the broader terms of
foreign policy.63
Planning postwar policy involved more than just governmental agencies. Quasigovernmental committees did much of the early planning. The Council on Foreign
Relation (CFR) was the main non-governmental agency that worked to develop foreign
policy and worked directly with the US State Department on many matters. The
unofficial nature of the CFR was helpful to a Roosevelt administration that was reluctant,
at this early stage, to publicly discuss its postwar planning objectives. A special type of
institution like the CFR was critical to the validation of policy and to help develop a
supportive public opinion. Despite a wide range of opinions and organizations actively
commenting on policy at the time, the internationalist philosophy of the CFR best fit the
views of the State Department. The CFR was helpful in developing the “correct” public
opinion by direct contact between CFR sanctioned committees and the American
public.64 The necessity for governmental secrecy had to be balanced with the need to
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influence public opinion. Non-governmental agencies like the CFR were free to openly
influence public opinion.
The group officials working at the State Department were strong internationalists,
overwhelmingly in favor of free trade and easing commercial restrictions. This directly
contradicted the reality of world governance up to this time. In general, during the first
half of the nineteenth century, national economies had been moving away from laissezfaire capitalism and moving toward one form or anther of collectivism. Whether it was,
New Deal programs in the United States, or totalitarianism in Germany, a wide range of
national and international economic controls was increasingly focused on national
economic development and forsaking international commercial relations.65 State
Department officials were committed to change the situation by opening up international
commerce in both the United States and abroad.
Planning for the postwar period started in 1939 and was centered at both the US
State Department and the CFR. A group of planners assembled under the direction of
Secretary Hull who agreed in principle on a basic set of common beliefs. These beliefs
were to have a significant impact on US foreign policy from this date forward. The
change from an isolationist to an internationalist attitude of the US government policy
after WWII can be traced to the early ideas and recommendations made by these CFR
and State Department officials.
One commonly-held belief was that planning should start early. US postwar
planning was underway by the summer of 1939, more than two years before the United
States went to war. The agenda was unfocused and leisurely, but it provided a solid basis
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on which future relationships would build.66 Early planning was also kept confidential;
the Roosevelt administration sought to develop political unity before the public
discussion was started.67 There was still extensive isolationist resistance to US
involvement in European affairs. There was concern on the part of the president that US
public opinion would backfire against US involvement in a European war if postwar
planning if it became public to early.68
Another common belief among planners was that nations should strive to provide
their citizens with a high standard of living in the postwar period. Despite the claims of
superiority, neither German Fascism nor Soviet Communism was able to provide a higher
standard living for their citizens.69 US planners placed great emphasis on a “social
objective.” It was incumbent on governments everywhere, as expressed by Roosevelt’s
Four Freedoms Speech, to create conditions of economic security and higher levels of
individual well-being.70 In a speech delivered in 1942, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, proclaimed
that once the earth is freed from the menace of these sinister forces, international
relations will have to be organized in such a way as to ensure the economic and social
welfare for individuals everywhere and to create international economic conditions that
will make possible an efficient utilization of human and material resources of the world
to maintain a measure of employment and rising standard of livings everywhere.71
During WWII, there was a great increase in the role of economists and economic
planning at the State Department. Officials thought that the US public was more likely to
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support international economic collaboration than international political collaboration.72
Starting in the 1930s, government officials had given extensive consideration to
international economic policy and, from that time on, were focused on providing
economics solutions to postwar problems.73 In 1942, Secretary Hull commented that the
most important feature of postwar planning was to build sound international commerce.74
Taking these considerations into account, early planning focused on developing a vibrant
international commercial community as a cornerstone for an enduring peace.
State Department planners unanimously believed that the United States should
occupy the dominant position in the postwar world. The United States would finally
accept its global responsibility over matters vital to US security interests.75 Planners
believed in an expanded geographic area of economic development, a “Grand Area”
covering the Western Hemisphere, large portions of Europe, Asia, and include the
defeated Axis powers of Germany and Japan.76
US planners believed that the United States would play the decisive role. A wide
variety of officials believed that US foreign economic policy would be the crucial player
in the postwar world.77 They believed that an increasing number of world leaders
understood that the influence of the United States would be decisive after the war. The
views of the United States on economic relations would have to be accepted by the rest of
the world.78
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The State Department reaffirmed US anti-cartel policy. Americans commonly
believed that industrial cartels, monopolies, and trusts violated the public interest.79
Postwar planners heartily agreed with American policy against this form of market
control. A number of European countries did not possess a similar tradition against
cartels; conversely, many countries, especially Germany, encouraged cartels. German
firms like I.G. Farben, used cartels to further Nazi goals.80 State Department officials
were determined that the defeat of the Nazi armies must be followed by the eradication of
these weapons of economic warfare. German industrial cartels would have to be broken
up and their political activities stopped.
State Department planners also held a common view on repartitions. Both the
United States and Great Britain were in favor of a smaller amount of reparation
payments, whereas the French and Soviets were likely to ask for large reparation
payments. US policy for post-WWII German reparation payments would need much
consideration. The early leadership of the United States in formulating a reasonable
settlement was critical.81 Developing a reparations figure by adding up the costs of
restoring the wealth of all German victims would have led to an astronomical amount far
in excess of Germany’s ability to pay. Because of this, the assessment of German
reparation payments should not be a matter of justice and rights but one of economics and
politics. Not only would Germany’s ability to pay have to be considered but also the
effects of reparation payments on all sectors of the receiving country. As William
Diebold, Jr., Research Secretary for the Council of Foreign Relations Economics Group,
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agued in “What Shall Germany Pay,” it was in the long-run interests of the allied powers
to preserve a valid economy in Germany. It was important that the United States develop
a postwar position and that the position be wise and farsighted. Many countries,
especially the USSR, would pursue heavy reparations.82 The United States and Great
Britain would have to struggle to promote a moderate and practical reparations program
for the good of international commerce.
Building a Multilateral World
The haunting specter of a reoccurring depression caused postwar planners to pay
close attention to the critical relationship between international and domestic economics.
A new global order based on economic integration was justified by the disastrous history
of the 1920s and 1930s.83 Planners tied the prosperity of the American economy very
closely to the outside world. They held a common conviction that a loss of large export
markets would again cause a lowering of national income and a growth in unemployment
as it had during the interwar period.
The State Department envisaged a radical change in global international relations;
their design emphasized an increase in prosperity by widespread use of multilateral trade.
In a speech delivered in July 1940, Secretary Hull declared, “General postwar
rehabilitation would depend on the revival of international commerce with liberal trade
principles.”84 No nation can provide the necessities of modern life for its own people if it
has access solely to its own resources. A group of nations cannot attain a high level of
well-being in isolation. To be able to trade one nation’s surplus for the production of
82
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another nation’s surplus does not necessarily mean unrestricted trade in the sense of an
absence of any regulation, but expanding economic prosperity does require a large
measure of flexibility in trade movement. International trade develops prosperity when it
is multinational in nature.85 The creed of liberalized trade driven by multilateralism was
to be a driving force in State Department policy and to have a deterministic effect of
postwar occupation policy in Germany.
With the end of WWII, a new opportunity presented itself. The State Department
saw the collapse of Germany as a chance to implement its economic policy
recommendations on an international scale. They were firm in their belief that it would
eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring depression. They held their eyes firmly on
postwar Germany as a unique proving ground for the planning in which they held so
much faith.

85

Pasvolsky, The Problem of Economic Peace after the War., 5.

45

Chapter II
1939–1944: Early Postwar Planning
Two Agencies Set the Agenda
The US State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) were the
two major contributors to early planning for postwar Germany. Initial groundwork was
started at the CFR with the blessing of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.1 Their
planning started in 1939, two years before the United States became involved in the war.
By 1942, the planners at the CFR became officially integrated into the State Department.
In 1944, other governmental departments became involved in postwar planning, but their
work was done without regard for previously completed State Department proposals.
Although officials within the State Department held a variety of ideas about the postwar
occupation of Germany, there was a consensus on the main goal of global
multilateralism.
The CFR War and Peace Studies
The CFR was founded in 1921 in New York as the nation’s leading foreign policy
think tank; it stood at the apex of liberal internationalism and provided a seedbed for US
foreign policy. The operation and interests represented by the CFR were overwhelmingly
from the East Coast elite, including businessmen, lawyers, and technocrats.2 Membership
was confined to influential people who shared an internationalist perspective, one that
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linked national interests with the interests of the US business class.3 The idea behind the
CFR, like its British sister organization Chatham House, was to establish a platform from
which to construct a well-informed public opinion. Public opinion would then be
channeled to support changes in governmental policy.4 Considering the emerging status
of the United States, the CFR’s policy recommendations were distinctly liberal with the
objective of opening up the entire globe for economic interaction.
The need for an organization like the CFR developed from the institutional
inadequacy of the American governmental to formulate a reasoned international policy.
US foreign policy in the early twentieth century was weak and incoherent. A lack of
national purpose caused mistrust by foreign governments and a failure to develop a
strong international presence. The CFR started as an institution that intended to redress
the American political realities of local-based constituents and pork-barrel patronage
whose outlook stopped at the nation’s border.5 Studying society through an emerging
technique of combining academic social science and business expertise, the CFR
associated itself with federal agencies and then advocated for solutions to deep-seated
international problems. If the United States were to take its rightful place and fulfill its
mission as a world leader, it would need a foreign policy that was internationally
orientated as well as bipartisan. The nation’s strong isolationist attitude was inward
looking and out of date; the United States needed to expand its policy perspectives to
internationalism. To accomplish this, the electorate would have to be united behind a
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modern political attitude.6 With the emergence of a global crisis in the 1930s leading to
the start of WWII, the CFR saw an opportunity to inject itself into the US foreign policy
by creating a structure and improving the cooperation among nations through the
expansion of international commerce.
The influence of the CFR was significant in that its proposed concept of an
expanded national interest, through international commercial development, eventually
became the foundation of State Department foreign policy. The basis for discussion of the
post-WWII national interest was first defined within an economic framework, focusing
on long-term economic trends that would benefit the United States. The national interest
was coupled to a “Grand Area,” identifying which foreign interests and regions of the
world would best satisfy US needs.7 Through the CFR, the American business class
became the dominant influence in the proposed expansion of American influence
overseas. Based on a policy of open access to raw materials and markets, this
opportunity, one that was expected to establish an environment of peace and prosperity,
was extended to all nations of the world.
The CFR formulated a process for the development of policy; it centered on a
study group of experts and researchers.8 The process involved four stages: determination
and analysis of anticipated problems engaging US interests; consideration of alternative
solutions for these problems; selection of the preferred solution and its formulation as a
policy recommendation; and a decision on policy recommendations that constituted the
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position taken by the United States in international negotiations.9 At the onset of WWII,
the CFR was better positioned than any other US interest group to influence the foreign
policy structure of the US government.
In 1939, it seemed clear that the future interests of the United States would
change. Members of the CFR and their acquaintances at the State Department saw this
development as an unparalleled opportunity. In early September of that year, Hamilton
Armstrong Fish, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of
the CFR, paid a visit to the State Department to offer their assistance. The CFR could
provide the State Department with research data and expert opinion to supplement
official policy. State Department officers welcomed Fish and Mallory and encouraged
them to generate a detailed plan. In December 1939, the CFR established the War and
Peace Studies Group under the direction of four general committees: Security and
Armaments, Political, Territorial, and Economic and Financial.10 Over the life of the War
and Peace Studies Group, 1939 to 1945, a total of 682 documents were prepared for and
sent to the State Department for consideration.11 The most prolific of these study groups
was the Economic and Financial Committee, highlighting the importance that the CFR
placed on the economic policy as the basis for the postwar policy.
Membership on the War and Peace Studies Group led to other work directly
related to the settlement of postwar problems, and most members were in both the CFR
and the US State Department. The CFR claimed that its members “were better prepared
to carry out their official duties as a result of having given long and specialized study to
9
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the problems of postwar settlement.”12 The list of US State Department employees who
were both members of the CFR and closely involved in official postwar planning
included Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, Norman Davis, Isaiah Bowman, Dr.
Leo Pasvolsky, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Dean Acheson, William Diebold, Jr., and
Adolf Berle.13 Although this group of co-members did not include Hull, every other
major State Department official who had influence over early postwar planning was also
a member of the CFR.
Between 1939 and 1942, the links between the CFR and the State Department
became increasingly interwoven. In February 1941, the CFR added a Division of Special
Research and appointed a State Department official, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, its director. This
close working relationship was further strengthened in 1942 when the State Department
organized the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies (ACPFP) under the
direction of Hull. Welles was appointed its vice chairman and Pasvolsky its executive
officer.14 This was essentially a transfer of the CFR postwar planning structure to the
State Department. Completely absorbed and reinvented in the State Department, the War
and Peace Studies Group was effectively transformed from a private entity to a
governmental operation and placed at the head of the State Department policy
formulation apparatus.15 The transfer of membership from the CFR to the ACPFP meant
that the objectives of the CFR became the objectives of the State Department.
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The ACPFP
On December 22, 1941, Hull sent a letter to Roosevelt confirming that in
accordance with the president’s desire, a special committee known as the Advisory
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies had been created to prepare for the countries
participation in the resolution of international problems that would likely confront the
United States after the defeat of the forces of aggression. This committee would be
charged with studies and recommendations that would be submitted to the president. The
purpose of the ACPFP was to establish and maintain contact with all appropriate
departments of any governmental and non-governmental agencies that were in a position
to contribute. Hull further stated that “all conversations or negotiations with foreign
governments bearing on postwar problems be conducted, under your authority, by or
through the Department of State.”16 The ACPFP advised in the fields of security,
economics, and other fields requiring international cooperation.17 The ACPFP established
a framework for all postwar decisions concerning America’s economic relationship with
the rest of the world.18 With the creation of the ACPFP, postwar planning became the
exclusive domain of the State Department. At this early date, there was no
interdepartmental debate of postwar policy. The State Department, which was heavily
influenced by internationalist economic policy, was free to develop its own vision. This
did not mean that their policy positions would later be accepted, but it did mean that they
had a head start over other departments and were able to spend the necessary time to
devolving a plan based on reason.
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During the initial phase of discussion between 1939 and 1943, the outcome of the
war had not yet been determined. Although a complete victory was not assured, planners
assumed that the United States would be a principle power after the war and would
accept major responsibility for determining the character of the postwar world. It was
understood that the preparation for peace would take much time and need careful
consideration.19 The nature and character of postwar states and their international
relationships were at the core of the ACPFP discussions. There was a concern that a
hastily developed plan, like those later developed in 1944 at other branches within the US
government, would repeat the same bad outcome of the post-WWI period. To avoid
repeating the same mistakes made after WWI, a fundamental change—one built on
economic interdependence at mutual prosperity—was needed in the structure of
international relationships.
Committee discussion was flexible, not rigid or preconceived, and membership
was becoming more diversified. By 1943, the work of the committee started to bring in
personnel from other cabinet level departments, including several officials with
interlocking committee memberships. The ACPFP added members from the houses of
Congress, the State, Treasury, and War Departments, the Executive Branch, and private
citizens. During this period, Hull was sick and spent much of his time out of Washington.
In Hull’s absence, Welles held the committee under close supervision and control.20 The
absence of Hull during this period left an open position at the State Department in which
Welles was eager to fill. Policy discussions led by Welles and other important members,
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like Bowman, still centered on the application of multilateralism; however, the treatment
of Germany still posed a unique problem as committee members took a position either in
support of or in opposition of the partitioning of Germany. Hull’s State Department as a
whole, even in his absence, held firm on supporting international multilateralism and
approached German prosperity not as a pro or con but how German prosperity would fit
into a prosperous international economic structure.
The goal of the ACPFP was to find a nonpartisan agreement on foreign policy and
a harmony of views between the Executive and Legislative branches. Policy
recommendations were to be coordinated by Welles and Pasvolsky, and then passed on to
Roosevelt through Hull. “The president desired to be able to reach in his basket and to
find whatever he needed in regard to postwar foreign policy and meantime wished to
devote himself wholly to ways and means of winning the war.”21 It would be left to the
ACPFP committees to determine the type of policy the United States wanted for the
postwar period. During this period, Roosevelt gave little guidance or indication to the
committees as to his policy preferences, and even though committee members turned out
large amounts of memos and position papers, he never used much of it in preparation for
high-level conferences at Teheran and Yalta.
The most important of the ACPFP committees was the economic subcommittee
headed by Pasvolsky. Pasvolsky was Hull’s favorite, a Russian born trade expert who
immigrated to the United States in 1905 and joined the State Department in 1934.22 Just
like Hull, Pasvolsky was committed to an international order based on multilateralism.
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Membership on the economic subcommittee also included Adolf Berle, Norman Davis,
Dean Acheson, and Dexter White. On March 6, 1942, the Economic Subcommittee held
its first meeting to consider Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement and the
comparative merits of bilateral and multilateral approaches to their implementation. The
main point of agreement among committee members was that pursuant to the Lend-Lease
agreement, all signatures that received lend-lease aid must, as a quid pro quo
arrangement, develop policies for the elimination of discriminatory trade practices and
trade barriers.23 In 1942, under the direction of Hull, the State Department’s main
concern for the postwar period was to rid the world of trade barriers. The State
Department believed that nations, like Great Britain, in critical need of aid and very
resistant to the potential loss of its trade preference, must as part of any lend-lease
agreement include a quid pro quo for their elimination of all discriminatory trade
practices.
Policy Papers Produced by CFR and ACPFP Members
From 1941 to 1944, officials from the ACPFP and the CFR composed and
submitted a number of policy papers and recommendations for the postwar period. Many
of these directly affected economic policy and were influential during the upcoming
German occupation. The ideas and policies in the three papers discussed in this section
expressed the views of the State Department and were considered to be rational and
carefully planned. These papers called for the development of a prosperous commercial
policy, the elimination of industrial cartels, and a reparation policy that would benefit
both the giving and receiving nations. The ideas addressed in these three position papers

23

Notter, United States, and Department of State., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945,
(1949), 84.

54
would later come under attack from Executive, Treasury, and War Department officials
as part of an interdepartmental conflict. Although the policy recommendations of the
ACPFR in 1944 had a striking similarity to the eventual policy arrived at by the late
1940s, the following recommendations were challenged by situational problems during
the military occupation period and tested as Cold War tensions grew between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Percy W. Bidwell, a member of both the CFR and the War and Peace Studies
Group and an advisor to ACPFP, wrote a policy paper in 1944 entitled “Postwar Controls
of the German Economy.” Bidwell recommended that policy should not be vengeful but
targeted at promoting German prosperity. Compensation for victims of German
aggression and procedures for disarmament should be designed to lay the foundations for
recovery on an international scale. “The victors should reject measures designed to
reduce Germany to a position of permanent economic inferiority. On the contrary, they
should plan their policy so as to make possible eventually receiving the defeated nation,
if its behavior in the interim is satisfactory, on equal terms into the international
organization.”24 Bidwell emphasized that his liberal policy recommendations would
require the victor nations to devote themselves to the prevention of further German
aggression over a period of time. In addition, to implement a liberal commercial policy
for Germany, it would be necessary to ensure Russian collaboration with both the United
Kingdom and the United States. Failing such collaboration, a Russo-German
rapprochement would seem certain.25 Bidwell proposed that the United States seek a
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collaborative policy with its Allies and be willing to stay in Germany for however long it
would take.
Bidwell further recommended that economic hostility should not be continued
after military hostilities have ended. Within three months of surrender, the naval blockade
of German ports should be lifted. Germany at once should be accorded most-favorednation status from each of the United Nations, and German tariffs should be lowered to
make their economy more interdependent with the world. With allied cooperation, a
lengthened occupation would be unnecessary, reducing burdensome occupation costs and
speeding up economic recovery.26 Allied occupation policy should not weaken German
production but should be used to serve the restoration of a vigorous economic life in
those European countries that depend on German markets and supplies. All postwar rules
of occupation should seem evenhanded to the German people and not breed resentment.
Economic controls would not be self-enforcing; they would require the constant diligence
of victor nations.27 The United States must be careful that the implementations of controls
do not arouse rivalry and friction between Allied nations in the event that economic gains
become unequally distributed.
The redevelopment of German industries might be objected to because it was
believed that peacetime industries could be converted back to war type production. This
was not a valid concern because conversion was a time-consuming process and could not
be carried out openly in postwar German on a large scale. Dismantling war industry did
not mean destroying industry. Germans should be permitted to salvage the plant
equipment from their armaments industry that could be converted to peacetime
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production uses.28 The remedy for the postwar was not the imposition of rigid limitations
but the establishment of flexible general conventions dealing with commercial policy of
which Germany must subscribe.29 The recommendations of this policy paper reflect a
liberal approach to the treatment of postwar Germany; these ideas were uniform with the
line of thought at the State Department but would run into future challenges from other
sectors of the government.
Arthur Gayer and Alvin Hansen, members of both the CFR and the War and
Peace Studies Group and contributors to the ACPFP, wrote a policy paper in 1944
entitled “The Control of International Cartels.” This paper outlines important
recommendations for postwar commercial policy pertaining to industrial cartels in
Germany, and highlights the unyielding position of the US State Department in
opposition to industrial cartels. The paper warns that if the United States continues to
pursue its traditional isolationist policy, we shall see a persistent development of
international cartels from which American firms will be excluded. Further, the effect of
WWII will be to reinforce the tendencies toward cartelization because a pursuit of
expansive policy will create excess productive capacity and the ability to dump products
overseas.30 The State Department placed a great emphasis on the danger of German
industrial cartels, and felt that if they could not be eliminated they should be regulated
into a free and prosperous system.

28

Ibid.
Ibid.
30
Arthur D. Gayer and Council on Foreign Relations, The Control of International Cartels. Its American
Interests in the War and the Peace; New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1944, 9.
29

57
The authors recommended that an international agency should be established in
which industrial cartel type agreements would be filed, disclosed, and regulated.31 This
agency would have authority over more than just one industry, and controls over cartels
would be made on a case-by-case basis.32 The overall goal was that specific cartel
agreements were only allowed if they were mutually beneficial and fit a scheme of an
expansive international economy.33 Most industrial cartel agreements crossed national
borders. Nations in the past often felt that they needed to join in or be left out; therefore,
cartel arrangements should be negotiated alongside tariff reductions as both policies cross
national borders and are complimentary of each other.34
The key factor in postwar was reparation policy. William Diebold, Jr., a member
of both the CFR War and Peace Studies Group and an advisor to ACPFP, wrote a paper
in 1944 entitled “What shall Germany Pay? The New Reparations Problem,” Diebold
warned that a danger would have existed if reparation policy were influenced by political
and military circumstances and not the most efficient and expansive economic policies.
German goods and services would be transferred to claimant countries only if certain
conditions are met and skillful management is exercised.35 Diebold recommends that
reparation policy should conform to the following principles: reparations should only be
imposed to the extent that they contribute to the strengthening of the postwar world
economic order; there should be no financial reparations; the amounts of goods and
services that are removed should be limited; obligations should be stated in specific
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amounts and specific types; the duration of the reparation period should be short; and
reparations should not be relied on as a major instrument of control over Germany.36
Diebold’s paper calls for the creation of a United Nations Reparations
Commission to formulate and coordinate a policy. The commission should decide
whether such goods could be supplied from Germany without impairing the efficiency of
the German productive plant below a certain level or reducing living standards below a
certain level. Diebold expected that the Russian government would put forth a strong
demand for reparations. Early estimates of legitimate Russian needs reached 200 billion
dollars.37 At this time, Russia must recognize that full compensation could not be
expected from Germany. At Tehran Stalin asked for 20 billion, an amount for which
Roosevelt would not guarantee. From the Russian point of view, reparation payments
should have been made to those whose damage was the largest as compared to their total
national wealth. They were expecting that payments could be made in kind or in the form
of manpower labor provided by German workers. Contrary to the Russian position, the
British did not want to repeat the problem created by the last war, and consequently, they
were not looking for any significant reparation payments.38
The State Department appreciated that the postwar German economy would be in
a delicate condition; a harsh reparation policy would cause serious harm not only to
Germany but all of Europe. State Department planners understood that like any other type
of foreign debt, reparation obligations could be repaid only by exporting more than was
imported or by liquidation of foreign assets. The total value of Germany’s foreign assets
was not great in comparison to the amounts of reparations sought. To pay reparations by
36
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exporting without receiving anything in return reduced the funds available to Germany
for investment, consumption, and commercial materials.39 If the goods, capital
equipment, and labor payments to be transferred were not chosen carefully, the
reparations process could have had bad consequences for both Germany and the receiving
nations.40 Under a wise reparations plan, Germany would recover slower but would be
working at full capacity gearing its reparations into Europe’s general economic
expansion. The fulfillment of Germany’s own economic requirement could be managed
and timed until it would help take up the slack in demand following an expected postwar
boom.
Diebold placed a great deal of emphasis on how a reparation plan should be
designed. It is important to understand that for the State Department, the purpose of
reparations was to jump-start the whole European economy and not for the benefit of any
one nation. The types of goods used to make payments would be crucial to both Germany
and the receiving nation. Unless reparations in the form of goods received are of a kind
that would have to be imported anyway, reparations would likely depress the receiving
nation’s economy. A poorly planned reparations program could also adversely affect the
economy of a third party nation. The types of goods exported from a debtor country can
make a significant difference; it would have been advisable for reparations to be paid
with goods in which Germany had a competitive advantage.41 A heavy reparations bill
would have a negative impact and would put an unreasonable low ceiling on the living
standards of Germany, while a lighter reparations bill would have been a positive
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influence and produced a core of demand that could have stimulated the German
economy.
During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union removed large quantities
of capital equipment. In 1944, Diebold questioned the desirability to Russia and other
receiving nations of taking capital equipment as a form of reparations. At the end of the
war, much of Germany’s equipment would be old and in need of maintenance or obsolete
and inefficient. It is possible that capital equipment gained in the form of reparation
payments could fill the immediate need until newer equipment could be procured. From
Germany’s point of view, the loss of its older capital equipment could clear the way for
new and modern equipment and might secure an advantage over the receiving countries
that would not have the same need to modernize.42 The very nature of reparations went
against the grain of planning for prosperity. The State Department understood how
difficult it was to take capital equipment from one economic environment like Germany,
and successfully transplant it into another foreign economic environment like Russia.
State Department recommendations by Diebold and others dictated that German
reparation policy be determined by considering its effect on the overall world economy,
not on the positive or negative effect on just one country. Obligations of defeated nations
should be based on their abilities and usefulness, not a total owed.43 If Europe was to
become economically viable after the war, Germany’s reparations needed to be light
enough to permit this. Reparations should be used in such a way as to promote rapid
recovery and to be managed on the basis of what can be achieved rather than bowing to
political pressure.
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Isaiah Bowman, the Attainment of American Economic Lebensraum
Isaiah Bowman and Sumner Welles were two high-level State Department policy
makers deeply involved in formulating postwar German policy. Both agreed with the
basic principles of multilateralism and universal prosperity, but their ideas and ambitions
for Germany, in particular, were in direct conflict with each other.
Isaiah Bowman was a key figure in the development of postwar policy for both
WWI and WWII. As head of the American Geographical Society for twenty years, his
expertise in territorial matters was highly prized by the US State Department. He was
also a member in high standing at the CFR, serving as its director and vice-president over
the duration of his membership. Bowman’s work as a State Department postwar planner
began in 1940, two years before the United States was in the war. He had become a major
influence in the process of freeing the colonies of the European powers and opening them
up for US commercial development.44 As WWII progressed, Bowman, like others at the
State Department, came to realize that territorial issues should be considered less
important compared to immediate military questions and postwar economic
considerations. This approach conflicted with the views of Roosevelt and his closest
advisors who believed that settling European accounts would come before the
development of a broader State Department’s priority for a “New World Order.”45
Bowman’s fundamental ideas about postwar planning coincided with most other
members of the CFR and the State Department, although strong differences arose
predominately over policy concerning a proposed German partition.
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Bowman saw the need for a change in US foreign policy based on the Russian
Revolution in 1917 and not the rise of the Nazis in 1933. For Bowman, the rise of a
Communist Soviet Union became a lightning rod for the emergence of a new liberal
foreign policy. The United States could no longer count on its good intentions to keep it
safe and prosperous. US foreign policy needed a gradual revolution toward a new liberal
internationalism.46 The new type of liberal internationalism proposed by Bowman would
involve a change of perspective; global organization after WWII should be based on
economic markets and not on occupied territory. Rather than a 1919 type World Order
based on geopolitical arrangements; the post-WWII version of a New World Order
should be based on economic arrangements. In a world of declining empires, Bowman
foresaw an “American Economic Lebensraum.”47 Control of economic resources, like
raw materials, workforces, and markets, was the direct key to national survival and
growth. Rather than measuring global power by an accumulation of territory, the new
global nexus would be established by trade and market share.
In the interwar years, Bowman was involved in an academic conflict with the
German geographical community. At international geographical conferences during the
early 1930s, Bowman openly expressed his concerns over the nature of German
geopolitics. At the time, he saw the rapid growth of a geopolitical pseudoscience in
German academia based on false notions of national territories. German geographical
academics were developing a preconceived system of political geography and making
facts conform to it. Bowman recognized this nationalist scheme in German political
geography. The Germans thought of the state as an organism apart from individuals that
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compose it. They spoke in terms of the rights of the state and the progressive
development of the state.48 In the late 1930s, Nazi propagandists added to the concept of
an expanded German Lebensraum by developing Grosswirtschaftsraum (greater
economic sphere), the argument that every great power had at its disposal vast territory
on which to develop its economic system. Great Britain and France had their colonies, the
United States and the Soviet Union had vast frontiers, and Japan had secured territory in
Asia. It was only a powerful Germany that had been confined to an undersized and
overpopulated space.49
Ideas about postwar international territorial organization fit into two different
groups: regionalism and globalism. Regionalism, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Welles were advocates, was an idea that nations within a certain geographical region
would band together to coordinate policy. Each region of the world would be policed by a
superpower. There still could be an international organization, but it would do little more
than coordinate the work of the regional organizations. Globalism, the other faction
whose advocates included Hull, Pasvolsky, Bowman, favored a single strong global
based organization to coordinate all policy. Early in the debate process, regionalism
promoted by Welles, was on the assent; but by the summer of 1943, with the persuasive
power of Bowman, views at the State Department were changing; most influential people
were now in favor of a globalist system. Hull felt that he and Bowman had also been
successful in changing Roosevelt’s point of view, and was confident enough to state in
his November 18, 1943 address to Congress that there would no longer be a need for
spheres of influence, alliances, or balance of power. The great powers must act together
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toward a single goal of a United Nations organization.50 It seems that Bowman and the
State Department were successful in changing US postwar planning toward a policy that
relied less on territorial possessions and more toward a market driven economic scheme
of global expansion. In late 1943, at the conference in Tehran between the three major
Allied powers, Stalin was prepared to press his territorial demands, but the US State
Department back in Washington was developing their own global scheme based on a
single global network of economic integration that extended beyond territorial borders.51

Sumner Welles, Europe, and Early Proposals for World Design
During WWII, Welles—a man whose vision would push the US postwar
transformation from a major power to a superpower and an architect of the coming
“American Century”—became Roosevelt’s chief spokesman on foreign affairs. Welles, a
self-professed internationalist, endeavored to promote the needs of an expanding
American economy. His close personal ties to Roosevelt, along with the marginalization
of Hull’s within the administration, enabled Welles to play a more pivotal role in postwar
planning than he might have otherwise enjoyed.52 In 1937, Welles was appointed
Undersecretary of State and took full advantage of his situation. At the time, he was 45
years old, energetic, ambitious, and a long-time friend of Roosevelt. In contrast, Hull was
66 years old and in poor health. Welles, a well-traveled linguist, seemed a better fit to
lead the State Department than Hull, who spoke only English and never left the United
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States.53 Welles’ philosophy at the State Department was that the US foreign policy
should be based on enlightened self-interest. He put emphasis on long-range plans,
establishing a New World Order and an international organization that would provide
peace and security. His policy was designed to be proactive, expand trade relations, and
improve relations with the Soviet Union.54 Welles personified the approaching vision of
the US State Department, but his forceful style ran against the grain of Hull’s authority.
When Welles entered office, he began a sweeping reorganization of the State
Department. In a pre-Churchill era (1937–1940), he pushed US foreign policy into an
activist anti-Nazi agenda and continued to search for ways for Washington to play a more
active role in the European crisis and develop closer ties to the Soviet Union. Welles,
unlike the rest of the cabinet, was one of the few administration officials to openly
support Roosevelt’s proposed use of pre-war economic pressure to combat aggressor
nations, like Germany and Japan.55 Welles’ foreign policy influence crossed department
lines, as he was an important figure in both the State Department and the Executive
Branch of the government.
After his appointment, Welles became the driving force behind the
administrations reorientation of foreign policy, which included an assumption of US
leadership for collective security, a free trade policy, and the calling of regular
international conferences to coordinate US interests. In 1937, he pressed for Washington
to act affirmatively toward German aggression in Europe. He thought that Hitler was not
acting in its long-term interests but on a case-by-case basis. He developed the Welles
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Plan, which called for diplomatic conferences and international economic measures to
combat aggression in an early demonstration of US/Allied unity. Welles intention was to
send a message to the world that the United States was going to play a more assertive role
in world affairs in an effort to discourage German aggression. Hull, along with many at
the State Department, rejected Welles’ proposals on the basis that they were too
aggressive.56 Despite an American public that seemed to support isolationism and a State
Department to timid to act, Welles continued to speak publicly of a proactive United
States pursuing a New World Order.57 Welles was Roosevelt’s right-hand man at the
State Department, and with Hull’s deteriorating health, there was an influential position
open for Welles to fill.
The uneasiness between Welles and Hull had more to do with personality than
with policy. Welles and Hull were in agreement on most State Department policies. Both
believed that the United States must change its international image characterized by the
Monroe Doctrine. They felt that the US foreign policy had been based on unilateralist
scheme, aroused legitimate suspicions, and prevented growth of inter-American interests.
In a postwar world, the United States can no longer maintain a unilateral approach and
limit itself to the Western Hemisphere. We must now embrace a multilateral position on
an expansive scale.58 The prosperity of the United States depends on the prosperity of the
rest of the world; by insulating the Western Hemisphere from international trade, the
United States would contribute to a depression. Only with fair trade policies can the
United States prevent the economic disasters of the past from reoccurring. Policies like a
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strict application of the Monroe Doctrine and the Ottawa agreements were obstacles to
world prosperity.59 Welles’ aggressive interpretation of policy, especially toward
Germany, was what distinguished him from Hull. Hull became increasingly uneasy with
Welles proactive approach to the looming German threat in Europe causing a split at the
State Department.
Welles believed the Germans had a false impression of the Monroe Doctrine and
were using that to advance their own foreign policy position. Welles maintained that the
Monroe Doctrine has never in reality been anything more than a unilateral declaration by
the United States that it would not permit any non-American power to interfere in the
political relations of the Western Hemisphere. It neither implied what the Germans
claimed—the exclusion by the United States of non-Americans’ powers from having any
trade relations with other American Republics—nor did it imply that the United States
had political power over its southern neighbors.60 American policy should make it clear
that even though political interference was not welcome free trade relations were.
Welles was also a strong advocate of improved relations with the Soviet Union.
He felt that many US officials had an “insane delusion” that communism and democracy
could not coexist. From a historical and a geopolitical perspective, Welles argued that the
United States and Russia were natural allies, and for the first time in its history, the
current Soviet government was guided by the popular will of its people.61 There were no
traditional or material grounds for antagonism between the people of Russia and the
people of the United States. In recent years, the Soviet government has discarded many of
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its most radical programs. From the Russian Revolution until WWII, the diplomatic
relationship between the US and the USSR has been troubled.62 In the postwar world, the
United States should develop solid relations with the USSR. The fact that the United
States is a Western power makes it natural for Russia to be suspicious, but better
diplomatic relations will be beneficial for both nations.63 Welles’ positive attitude of the
Soviets affected his policy recommendations on Germany. Welles saw Germany as a
rogue nation in which its European interests did not align with those of the United States.

Early Perspectives on German Partition
One of the most daunting concerns for postwar planners was how to finally curb
Germany’s expansionist ambitions. The debate centered on whether to partition the
country. Welles, a regionalist, was in favor of German dismemberment. Bowman,
Pasvolsky, and Hull were against German dismemberment.64 How a State Department
official lined up on German partition depended on two points. Those who looked to a
postwar world based on multilateralism rather than territorial concerns tended to favor a
unified Germany, whereas those who looked to regional spheres of influence based on
borders were more likely to favor a partition of Germany. A second factor depended on a
person’s views of the Soviet Union. Those with positive attitudes toward the Soviets
tended to favor a divided Germany. Leaders concerned about Soviet aggression in Europe
were in favor of a united Germany.
Welles and the ACPFP planners began the process of planning postwar policy by
assuming a complete defeat and unconditional surrender. Welles had strong views on
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German reconstruction. He felt that a dismembered, non-expansionist, and reconstructed
Germany could be an integral part of an integrated Europe; the new Germany should be
decentralized and returned to its “pre-Bismarckian period.” A unified Germany would be
too strong and would not be able to promote European postwar stability.65 In contrast,
Bowman claimed that in the long term, Russia would constitute a greater threat than
Germany. If the United States divides Germany, it may be forced in ten years to ask
Germany to reunite for the purpose of holding Russia in place.66 Bowman also felt that
the United States had no choice but to occupy postwar Germany and assume a greater
responsibility for European affairs.
The central argument for the planners in 1942 focused on whether Germany or the
Soviet Union was going to constitute a future threat. From the start, ACPFP members
drew sides with either Welles, who held a deep-seated antagonism for Germany, or with
Bowman, whose greatest concern was an aggressive Soviet Union. Bowman alleged that
a strong united Germany was needed as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union. Welles felt
that Germany’s power should be weakened by dividing the nation into a confederation of
autonomous republics held together only by a Zollverein, or customs union.67 Welles saw
his plan as a compromise; German districts would be large enough to support themselves
but not so large as to be a threat. He believed that dismemberment would eliminate
Germany’s two major internal threats: the Junker class and the German General Staff.
The consensus of US planners changed over time. In 1941, when German troops
were driving into Russia, it seemed imperative that the breaking up the German nation
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was the only solution. By 1943, with Soviet troops pushing back the Nazis, concern over
Soviet domination of Europe was taking hold.68 As Allied troops advanced across the
western front, many on the State Department planning committee started to change their
mind in favor of a united Germany. In addition to concerns about Soviet expansion, many
State Department planners felt that a divided Germany would be more difficult to
integrate into an American-led global economic system.69 As the end of the war
approached, the State Department focused on developing policy recommendations based
on how the German economy would fit into a postwar Europe and not on geopolitical
concerns.
Bowman and Welles may have been fighting for the same postwar US
international concept of a grand area, but their views differed sharply as to Germany’s
proper position in Europe.70 Welles’ deep-seated antagonism for what he believed was a
German tendency toward authoritarianism. He rejected what he felt was Berlin’s
nationalist centralized authority over a widely divergent group of German peoples. In
contrast, Bowman was motivated by economics and his anxiety over the Soviet Union.
All that was needed to prevent a resurgent German nationalism was disarmament. Peace
and prosperity could be achieved without economic and political dismemberment.71
Bowman believed that the centrality of German industrial capability was critical to the
future of European prosperity and necessary to impede Soviet influence.
Welles’ views on partition stemmed from his belief that the root problem was the
centralization of German power in Berlin. This process had created the ability for the
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Germans to become a menace. Individual Germanic states by themselves are not a threat;
therefore, the solution is to weaken Germany by partition. Welles claimed that there was
no valid reason why the German economy would be ruined by partition.72 The three
German states proposed by Welles (see maps below) would have a balanced economy
with portions of industrial, agricultural, and mineral resources.
Welles’ position most likely came from his views on both German history and the
tendencies of the German people. For Welles, history has shown that Germany had never
made any constructive contribution to world peace or regional peace. He acknowledged
German contributions to civilization but believed that the problem originated with the
willingness of the German people to fight for the German General Staff. Welles argued
that Germany may undergo defeat in WWII, but the German General Staff is a living
force that will re-inspire the German people to threaten the future peace of Europe.73 The
Nazi national psychology cannot be modified solely by a change in governmental
structure. Democracy must come from the people themselves; the current German youth
are poisoned and it might take some time before democracy can be established.74
Therefore, Welles believed that his nuance position would provide European security by
dividing Germany, but also that a series of Germanic states would be viable enough to
contribute to the economic recovery of Europe.

Department Rivals Push Back
In August 1944, a storm was brewing over the postwar treatment of Germany and
about to challenge the direction of State Department postwar planning. Both the Treasury
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Department and Roosevelt had distinctly different views on Germany and were about to
start an intergovernmental conflict that would have long-term ramifications. The State
Department had been working on planning since 1939 and had reached somewhat of
censuses with both the War Department and the British for the promotion of the German
economy. By 1944 officials from various branch of the government were starting to draw
up maps for postwar Germany, and it is from these maps that we can get a sense of the
state of the debate in 1944 concerning the direction of postwar policy.
All three of the following maps are dated from 1944. Each map highlights the
motivating forces behind the official who created them. The Sumner Welles map for the
proposed division of Germany was rooted in State Department policy in which
multilateral economic prosperity was a key concern. It was a carefully designed proposal
by which Germany was divided in an attempt to maintain the economic viability of each
German State, while satisfying Welles’ distrust of a large central German state. Welles’
desire to partition Germany sets him apart from most other State Department planners.
His motivation was to seek a middle ground and break up German military and political
power while still allowing for all the German industrial regions to contribute to European
prosperity.
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In contrast, the Roosevelt map reveals a different perspective on how to approach
the partition of Germany. The president’s delineations were made on a map of physical
geography void of any solid political boundaries, as if all the boundaries of Central
European nations were wide open for modification. Roosevelt’s zones dividing Northern,
Central, and Southern Germany were drawn in a haphazard manner, possibly an
expression of his desire to put off final plans for the partition of Germany until the
75

Ibid., 342.

74
occupation started. It is clear from this map that in 1944, Roosevelt had made no careful
consideration for the economic welfare of these future German states.

FDR Map76

Finally, the Morgenthau map shows no concern for the economic maintenance of
a German state. Major tracts of highly productive regions would have been given away.
Poland would get Upper Silesia, France would get the Saarland, and all of Rhine and
Saxony areas would be put under international control. Many of Germany’s major ports
would be lost and much of the nation would be landlocked, cut off from international
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commerce. It seems clear that the objective of Morgenthau’s proposal was to cripple
Germany.

Treasury Department Map77
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Chapter III
1944–1945: Interdepartmental Struggle
The Treasury Department Offensive—August 1944
August 1944 was the starting point for a crisis in the postwar planning process.
The Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., with an unwelcome provocation,
tried to change the direction of postwar planning that was already well underway at the
State and War Departments.1 The disturbance by Morgenthau was unexpected, like a
sudden storm catching the State and War Departments by surprise. Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, agreeing with Hull over the egregious nature of the interference,
referred to this incident as the most contentious interdepartmental struggle of his thirtyfive year cabinet-level career.2 Morgenthau’s intrusion into the planning for the
occupation of Germany went far beyond the legitimate agenda of the Treasury
Department. By the summer of 1944, both the State and War Departments had been
making like-minded contributions to a policy plan that would lead to a constructive peace
for Germany and Europe as a whole. In a single purposeful stroke, Morgenthau forced
American policy toward Germany to take a dramatic turn that would cause detrimental
ramifications for Germany and Europe during the first three years of the postwar period.
This was not the first time that Morgenthau had interfered. Hull had grown
resentful of the Treasury Secretary from his earliest days in government. Hull alleged that
Morgenthau seldom lost an opportunity to step into State Department jurisdiction and
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obstruct policy. Often times he was found to be conducting negotiations with foreign
governments on his own.3 Hull believed that Morgenthau was driven by emotion and
frequently sought to use his close relationship with the president to induce actions that
were contrary to the State Department’s better judgment. Hull considered Morgenthau’s
interference in postwar planning for the occupation of Germany as his worst offence.4
After August 1944, any chance of a studied rational approach to postwar policy in
Washington was over. The policy consensus created by the planners at the State
Department, War Department, and CFR would have to be put aside. This dispute became
a long and bitter quarrel between cabinet-level departments in which the near term fate of
Germany hung in the balance.5 A victory for Morgenthau would mean economic misery
for Europe and the German people. A victory for the State Department would mean a
faster recovery for Europe and a lessened burden on US occupation forces.
The interference started in August 1944, upon Morgenthau’s return from a trip to
Europe, when he informed Roosevelt about what he considered the proposed liberal
treatment of Postwar Germany by the State and War Departments. He was referring to
numerous State Department planning memoranda and the War Department’s
occupational handbook. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) Handbook was to provide the US Military with instructions for the occupation.
Morgenthau, a close personal friend and long-time aide to the president had enough
access and influence to press Roosevelt into taking action.6 Both Roosevelt and
Morgenthau were in favor of harsh treatment for Germany and both considered State and
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War Department plans too sympathetic to Germany.7 On August 26, 1944, Roosevelt sent
a memorandum to Hull and Stimson criticizing both the SHAEF Handbook and the
State’s proposed lenient treatment of Germany. The president expected them to reassess
their positions on the treatment of postwar Germany.
In early September of 1944, because of his dissatisfaction with the postwar policy
and discontent among his Cabinet members, Roosevelt called for the creation of an
informal “Cabinet Committee on Germany” to resolve policy disagreements dealing with
the occupation. The committee was to consist of Hull, Stimson, Morgenthau, and the
Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins.8 The committee meetings were the beginning of
a contentious debate between Hull and Stimson who favored rebuilding Germany and
Morgenthau who wanted to deindustrialize Germany. The committee held only a few
meetings that resulted in no resolution to the conflict. Roosevelt had no intension of using
this committee to set policy, the purpose of the meeting was to resolve the turmoil within
his cabinet. As was so often the case with the president, policy would be would be set by
him, at his discretion.
On September 12, 1944 at the Second Quebec Conference held with British Prime
Minister Churchill, Roosevelt reinforced his support for Morgenthau’s plan. The agenda
of the conference was intended to be a discussion of Allied military objectives, but
matters turned to address Lend-Lease aid for Britain and the postwar treatment of
Germany. With Hull and other State Department officials not in attendance the president
had a free hand to institute postwar policy. Churchill was determined to secure additional
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Lend-Lease aid for Britain, while Roosevelt called on Morgenthau to convince the British
to accept Morgenthau’s plan for punitive treatment of Germany.9 In the end, a quid-pro
quo agreement was reached in which Roosevelt and Morgenthau gained Churchill’s
agreement for a harsh treatment of Germany; in exchange, they agreed to give Britain
additional Lend-Lease aid.10 It was clear from the negotiations that both the Treasury
Secretary and the president would be forceful in their desire to ensure that the postwar
period in Germany would be a difficult one.
Morgenthau’s actions in August and September of 1944 dismayed Hull; the
Treasury Department’s intrusion into postwar planning was a repudiation of the State
Department’s central doctrine of multilateralism. By advocating for economic misery in
Germany, Morgenthau was putting the postwar prosperity of Europe and the world at
risk.11 The difficulties between the State and Treasury Departments had implications far
beyond the German occupation. Treasury officials were looking toward a measured
future of monetary regulation and securitized international lending, similar to those
recently formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference; it seemed that that they were
limiting postwar policy to repairing the problems of the interwar period. Officials at State
had a more grandiose policy plan; they were optimistically looking to the future with its
vision of an expansive commercial network delivering prosperity to all.
The president and his Cabinet Departments all had competing ideas on ways to
address global economic issues at the end of the war. Roosevelt saw the promotion of
postwar global prosperity by the exportation of US New Deal-type programs in which he

9

John Dietrich, The Morgenthau Plan Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (New York: Algora
Pub., 2002), 53.
10
Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 54.
11
Ibid., 52.

80
would be free to pick winners and losers among nations. Morgenthau and his closest
advisor at the Treasury Department, Dexter White, were striving for global financial
security by the use of monetary regulation and the securitization of international lending.
Hull and postwar planners at the State Department promoted a wide-open style of
prosperity in which every nation could participate through the reduction of trade barriers
and the elimination of quotas and cartels. Stimson at the War Department believed in an
economic policy that aligned closely with Hull’s, but Stimson’s overriding concern was
that the US military occupation forces in Germany should have a free hand and not be
restricted by any departmental economic doctrine. These competing postwar ideologies
created a conflict that contaminated the first few years of the occupation of Germany.
The first major result of the US conflicted policy was the implementation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directive JCS1067. This directive was secretly issued in April 1945
just as Allied troops were moving into Germany. Assistant Secretary of War John
McCloy played a key role in authoring the directive and working through the
interdepartmental struggle to get something on paper. Though he did not solve the
interdepartmental disagreement or get unanimous approval, he did advance a document
that gave some guidance to the military commanders in charge of the German
occupation.12 Initially, JCS1067 appeared less punitive than Morgenthau’s plan, but the
overall attitude of the directive implied the economic stagnation of a devastated
Germany.13 The State Department was never in agreement with the text of the directive
and insisted to change it as it was being written.
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The struggle to pushback against the Morgenthau Plan was just one example of
the effort made by the State Department to change the long-term direction of US foreign
policy. Throughout the 1940s, they never gave up on their commitment to a multilateral
approach, even in the face of a direct challenge from the executive and cabinet-level
branches of government.14 The policy positions worked out by the early planners under
the direction of Hull and Pasvolsky may have been refined and restated by the State
Department at various points during this period, but the essence of their position was
never abandoned.

Treasury Department’s Position
Introduction of the Morgenthau Plan grew out of the Treasury Secretary’s deep
disgust for German conduct toward the Jews, being of Jewish descent he was morally
outraged at Nazi racism. He and Roosevelt rejected the distinction made by the State
Department between the German people and the Nazis. All Germans deserved harsh
treatment, a type of forced rural resettlement program and a soup-kitchen standard of
living.15 The Morgenthau Plan called for the dismantling of German heavy industrial
capabilities on a massive scale. The United States should not allow Germany to rebuild
itself and must limit its economy to agriculture and light industry. Germany would be
partitioned, large parts of it given away to its neighbors, and the Ruhr should be
internationalized. The country would be occupied and economic poverty would be
enforced. There would be no economic recovery in which to pay reparations. All capital
equipment would be disassembled and given out as remuneration.
14
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A debate among historians has surfaced as to who was responsible for the
Morgenthau Plan. The inquiry centered on White who played a crucial role in the
formation of the Morgenthau Plan. It seems true that White was both a Communist
sympathizer and a Soviet agent.16 However, the argument that White skillfully
maneuvered Morgenthau into developing the plan at the command of the Soviets does not
seem valid. Looking closely at postwar goals for the Soviet Union, if White was acting at
the direction of the Soviets, the Morgenthau Plan would have more carefully followed
Soviet goals. He would have allowed for a German capability to pay larger reparations
and advocated for a united Germany in anticipation of eventual Soviet domination.17 It
seems more likely that White’s contribution to the Morgenthau Plan was in direct
accordance with the wishes of both Morgenthau and Roosevelt, not those of Stalin.
Although it appears that White was not the instigator of the Morgenthau Plan, it
was clear to State Department officials that the resourcefulness of White in mastering the
main points of interdepartmental meetings and reports transformed Morgenthau’s vague
knowledge and passions into a clear, well-organized statement of the Treasury’s
position.18 He had previously attended interdepartmental meetings that addressed German
policy, but postwar planning was not his responsibility. In July 1944, White had just
concluded his work at the Bretton Woods Conference in which he and the Treasury
Department had hosted. With all of the effort required to organize the Bretton Woods
Conference, it was difficult to see how he would have been in a position to generate the
Morgenthau Plan. However, his opinion on Germany coincided with the majority view of
the Treasury Department and he had a full staff of Treasury officials available to help
16
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assemble policy plans.19 When a liberal policy toward Germany was in the works at both
the State and War Departments in August 1944, White was qualified and willing to
amplify the Treasury Department’s punitive policy for which Morgenthau would fight.
The differences of opinion on postwar economic matters between State and
Treasury were not confined to the treatment of Germany. The two departments had a
fundamental disagreement on how to rebuild the world economic system. The argument
made by the Treasury Department was that full free trade would not promote general
prosperity.20 White and the Treasury Department believed that exchange rate stabilization
and the promotion of international investment were more practical methods of solving the
world’s economic problems. As White stated in 1942, “The theoretical basis for the belief
still so widely held, that interference with trade and with capital and gold movements,
etc., are harmful, are hangovers from a nineteenth century creed, which held that
international economic adjustments, if left alone, would work themselves out toward an
‘equilibrium’ with a minimum of harm to world trade and prosperity. It is doubtful
whether that belief was ever sound.”21 The type of policy advocated by the Treasury
Department would produce a narrower range of growth in international economic activity
than that of State Department. Even if it threatened a percentage of overall European
output, the Treasury Department was still willing to destroy German industrial
production.
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In a head to head competition for the implementation of foreign policy during the
Roosevelt presidency the Treasury had an advantage over State. Morgenthau was a long
time confidant of the president and had always been willing to do Roosevelt’s bidding.
By 1944, the Treasury Department had successfully challenged the ambitions of State
Department planners and shifted the focus from free trade issues to monetary regulation
and capital investment funds.22 The Bretton Woods Agreement sponsored by the
Treasury, was under-funded and completed nine months before the end of the war. The
agreement actually undercut State Department strategy, because of the relatively small
amounts committed by its participating nations, international commerce was relegated to
a relatively low level.
In September 1944, it appeared as if the State Department did not have the
political power to realize their postwar dream. As long as a close relationship existed
between the president and Morgenthau, it would be difficult for Hull to change
Roosevelt’s mind or challenge the Treasury Department’s initiative. The Treasury
Department used a wide range of arguments to support its policy position. One of their
main arguments addressed the reparations issue. The Treasury Department was against
Germany making reparation payments. If Germany were expected to pay recurring
reparations in the form of goods produced, then the German industrial economy would
have to be rehabilitated.23 Both the State and Treasury Departments recognized that a
long-term reparation program making payments from goods produced would require a
reconstructed Germany; this was a notion to which the Treasury Department was
vehemently opposed.
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The Treasury Department asserted that it was a fallacy to think that Europe
needed a strong industrial Germany. Morgenthau pointed out that the United States, Great
Britain, France, and the Benelux could supply enough coal for Europe’s needs. The
elimination of competition from Ruhr industry would be of great benefit to the British
and other economies. In summary, the Treasury Department argued that Britain would
recover faster without German competition.24 This was Morgenthau’s main selling point
to Roosevelt. A chief concern for the president after the war and the recovery of the
British economy, the argument that the eliminating German competition would be of
great benefit to the British was convincing.
Morgenthau’s based his position on the principle that economic prosperity in
Germany would lead to future aggression. The Treasury Department maintained that
modern German militarism had its basis in the Ruhr. This region rich in coal had been the
foundation of an industrial apparatus that was deliberately guided by military objectives.
The elimination of a prosperous Ruhr industrial apparatus would make future German
aggression impossible.25 This principle was a direct contradiction to the main premise
upon which the State Department’s developed it policy plan. The State Department
starting planning in 1939 with the conviction that Germany’s future economic prosperity
would lead to peace. Early postwar planners had based policy development on the
supposition that it was economic deprivation that led to the start of WWII.
Morgenthau’s Plan specified that no relief should be supplied to Germany other
than what was needed to prevent disorder. The Treasury Department recommended that
the responsibility for sustaining the German people rested with the Germans and not with
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the Allied occupation forces. Allied Military Governments should not assume
responsibility for price controls, rationing, unemployment, reconstruction, housing, or
transportation. No relief supplies should be imported beyond the minimum to prevent
disease and disorder.26 With so many punitive measures included that would cause
postwar Germans continued misery it seems to be evident that Morgenthau’s motives
were based on retaliation.
By January 1945, there had been no resolution or agreement among the Cabinet
Secretaries over the German issue. By this time, the battlefield front lines in Europe were
changing rapidly as both Soviet and Western forces were advancing across Europe. As
the positions of the armies changed, so did the points of contention. In a January 1945
memorandum, Morgenthau expressed a new list of concerns to the president. It was
important that German heavy industrial capabilities be completely destroyed, not just its
weapons industry. The Germans were versatile just like the Americans. US industry was
converted from a great peacetime industry in 1940 to the world’s greatest producer of
military weapons in 1944. The German people with access to heavy industry could do the
same. Anyone who disagreed with this point was simply expressing a fear of Russia and
communism. Morgenthau stated, “This twenty-year old argument of a “bulwark against
Bolshevism” is one factor of what brought this war down on us.”27 By this statement
Morgenthau was responding to a new argument being advanced by the likes of Bowman
and others at the State Department who were attracting converts to the anti-Soviet camp
over concerns that Soviet armies might overwhelm Europe.
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It was apparent through the spring of 1945 that the Morgenthau-Roosevelt
coalition for harsh treatment of Germany was in firm control. Challenges from the State
and War Departments had been rebuffed. Despite small changes made to the wording, the
directive being written during at this time still ended up with a strong anti-German
attitude.

War Department’s Position
During WWII, the influence of the military in Washington was imposing, to the
extent that major aspects of US foreign policy became dominated by the War
Department. In most matters, the War Department had the ability to veto any proposal
formulated at the State Department.28 McCloy pointed out that the State Department had
been working on a policy for postwar Germany for years; however, because of the
preoccupation with winning the war, State Department planners were not linked to the
War Department’s policy. After Pearl Harbor, the State Department had neither the
budget nor the political power to rival the influence of the military.29 Even though the
War Department had the power and position to challenge any postwar policy formulated
by State Department planners, the State and War Departments were in agreement on
many of the main ideals for the postwar German economy. But an even more important
factor was the exemplary reputation of Stimson and his relationship with Hull. This
meant that the War Department and its distinguished Secretary Stimson constituted a
significant ally for the State Department in its struggle over the postwar treatment of
Germany.
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Despite the similarity between Stimson and Hull on policy, they came to their
respective positions based on different motivations. Unlike Hull, Stimson was an
Anglophile who believed postwar policy should center on the same concept as the
concept the United States followed during the war—the fundamental unity of AngeloAmerican interests.30 However, they both agreed with the central notion that the United
States should become more involved in world affairs and that a future of peace would be
based on global economic prosperity. Stimson stated, “Germany would have to be
punished and its leadership changed, but also, Germany would have to be rebuilt and
restored to the center of Europe’s economy.”31 He categorically opposed a punitive
settlement that would leave Germany in a state of postwar chaos. This point was critical
for the War Department officials because they were going to be in charge of the
occupation, one that would be long and difficult in a chaotic situation.
By 1944, it appeared that the US Army was going to outrun the policymakers.
Stimson remarked to the president in August 1944, “We were running into a lack of
preparedness. Our troops were going into Germany and they had no instructions.”32 Even
thought SHAEF had been developed as a military occupation plan with little guidance
from Washington, the policy laid out in the SHAEF Handbook was in harmony with the
views of both Stimson and the State Department planners. By September 1944, Stimson
had approved the recently completed handbook.33 It was this handbook and the
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supporting memoranda from the State Department that Morgenthau and White had
reacted to vehemently in August 1944.
The overriding interest of the War Department during the occupation was its
ability to be in complete control. Stimson and McCloy were resolute in their insistence
that the officers in charge of Germany not be tied down to any policy principles. The
assumption of responsibility for the occupation must be undivided and controlled by the
military. It was felt that the occupation would be a test of the ability for the United States
and the Soviets to cooperate. The desire for complete control was felt so strongly that the
US military believed any combination of US and British occupation forces would not be
advisable because it would severely limit the freedom of American policy in Europe.34 It
was expected that the creation of separate zones for the British and US forces was a
necessity so that the US military could have a free hand in mediation with the Soviets.
Stimson had other reasons to support a constructive treatment; he felt that fair
treatment of Germany would signal to the world that the United States would build a
prosperous, peaceful world.35 Stimson was a member of a Cabinet that was deeply
divided on occupation policy. Stimson believed that Germany would have to be the
dominant economy for Europe to recover. Hull advocated for a viable but not dominate
Germany. Morgenthau wanted the Germany industrial base smashed. Stimson found
himself in strong opposition to Morgenthau. In his memorandum to the president on
September 5, 1944, Stimson expressed his concerns over three points of Treasury’s
economic policy and how bad its implementation would appear to the rest of the world:
(1) that the standard of living be held down to subsistence levels; (2) that the German
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economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; and (3) that the German
economy must be converted so as to be dependent upon imports and exports.36 The War
department was directly responsible for the outcome of the German occupation and he
did not want a repeat of the Treaty at Versailles and its economically senseless demands.
The speed of reconstruction was of great importance if the United States hoped to avoid
great convulsions in Europe. Punitive methods would not prevent war; they would breed
war.37 Stimson recommended that Treasury policy be discarded; perhaps the Ruhr’s
economic resources could be put under international control, but not destroyed.38 For
Stimson, if Europe were to recover, Germany would have to be the center of the
European economy.
By September 1944, to defend their position, both Stimson and Hull had to
challenge the president on his postwar plan. As a rebuff to Roosevelt’s agreement at the
Second Quebec Conference, Stimson sent a memorandum reiterating his point, “Sound
thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in
others. The only question now is whether seventy million educated, efficient, and
imaginative German’s can be kept within the bounds on such a low level of
subsistence.”39 Stimson reminded the president that he had declared in the Atlantic
Charter that victors and vanquished alike were entitled to freedom from economic want.
The harsh suppression of Germany for the benefit of other nations would go against what
Hull had been trying to accomplish since 1933.40 However, a policy directive for the
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military had to be written; the challenge for the War Department over the winter of 1944–
1945 was to write a directive that would get the approvals of the president and
Morgenthau but give enough flexibility to the military to be workable in Germany.
The War Department’s influence over the creation of JCS1067 fell on McCloy.
He realized how difficult it would be for the military to implement the Morgenthau Plan
in postwar Germany, so in response, he worded the directive to win the approval of the
Treasury but still give military commanders maximum flexibility. The directive was in
the works for most of the winter and was signed by President Truman in May 1945.41
McCloy ensured that certain phrasing was included within the text to allow the
occupation forces enough interruptive leeway to respond to the situation on the ground.

State Department’s Position
By August 1944, State Department policy planners were the only department to
have spent the last five years making a persistent effort to assemble a post-war policy.
Planners considered their work to be based on reason and held a conviction that their
intentions for the postwar world were good. The proposed postwar policy advocated by
the State Department was based on a set of rational assumptions with which neither
Morgenthau nor the Treasury could agree.
In matters concerning the postwar economy, Hull was neither pro-Germany nor
anti-Germany. He and his department were in favor of a Germany that was integrated
into a European world economy on the basis that this would be a requirement to achieve
long-term peace and prosperity. Rebuilding a strong Germany was not Hull’s aspiration;
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it was multilateral economic development that by necessity included Germany.
Considering the recent tragedy of Nazi brutality, Hull’s position on Germany over the
course of the planning period may have seemed detached, but he believed it was time to
make a clean cut with his emotional ties to history and to plan a future based on optimism
and opportunity.
One early premise for postwar planning was that a united Germany fit into the
State Department concept of a multilateral world. Multiple zones of occupation would be
detrimental to international commerce. One of the forms of occupation that they had
given serious consideration to was an inter-allied occupation.42 As early as 1942, the
State Department was hopeful that an arrangement could be made in which there would a
mix of Allied troops throughout all of Germany. Having a truly joint occupation with no
national sectors would go a long way toward guaranteeing that the Allies would not
divide Germany.43 The consensus among planners was that the forcible partition of
Germany would create a situation based on “spheres of influence” and should be
opposed.44 As late as 1944, they believed that both the British and the Soviets could
eventually be persuaded to support a united multilateral Germany.45 It was not until 1947
that the State Department came to recognize that the division of Germany might become
a necessity to at least guarantee that the Western zones of Germany were included in a
multilateral Europe.
Another basis for the policy positions taken by State was the belief that the
assimilation of the Germany economy into a grand European economy was all that was
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necessary to end any future German military threat. In August 1944, Hull upheld his
position that partition should not be imposed and that Germany should be assimilated into
the world economy without discrimination and dismemberment.46 The Secretary
maintained that the forced conversion of German economic capacity from war to peace
production would be sufficient to eliminate any future German military threat. This
process would cause a fundamental change in the organization of German economic life
and, in return, would pay a large peace dividend. 47 Hull had a deep-seated confidence in
the policy recommendations of his department. Despite genuine fears by many about the
future security of Europe, Hull was willing to trust that sound international economic
policy would be sufficient to eliminate future German militarism.
On September 5, 1944, the first Cabinet Committee meeting was held in which
Morgenthau, Stimson, and Hull met to discuss postwar treatment of Germany. At the
meeting, it appeared to Stimson as if Hull was in support of Morgenthau’s Carthaginian
peace. Stimson commented that he (Stimson) was the only one at the meeting in favor of
reconstructing Germany. Stimson speculated that Hull had buckled under the pressure of
the president and Morgenthau, only to revert back to his longtime policy of a prosperous
postwar Germany at a later date.48 In his memoirs, Hull explained his position in the
meeting on September 5, 1944, stressing that at no time did he demonstrate any support
for Morgenthau’s economic policy in Germany.49 It is evident that there was a difference
between how Hull and Stimson approached a reconstructed Germany; however, there is
no support shown by Hull for Morgenthau’s Plan. The lengthy evidence in the State
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Department records along with Hull’s account of the Cabinet Committee meetings
highlights a disagreement between Hull and Stimson, but does not indicate any support
by Hull for Morgenthau’s plan. All positions taken by Hull at the Cabinet Committee
meeting were consistent with long-time State department policy. The Secretary of State
opposed German partition, opposed complete deindustrialization, and discredited the idea
of an agriculturalized Germany.50 In the meeting on September 5, 1944, Hull presented
and used as a basis for discussion the September 4, 1944 State Department memorandum
in which it is stated “The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition
of Germany.”51 In addition, “It is in the long-range interest of the United States the
Germany be prosperous but that, at the same time, the German economy should not again
be directed to war-like purposes.”52
In his memoirs, Hull helped to explain what appeared to be contradictory
comments, but were in fact consistent with long-term State department policy. Hull stated
three objectives for postwar German economic policy. First, “the standard of living of the
population should be held down to subsistence levels.”53 This seems punitive, but a
distinction can be made by which the reconstruction of a prosperous Germany could
entail the temporary enforcement of lower living standards for the purposes of rebuilding
commerce and paying reparations. Second, “Germany’s economic position of power in
Europe must be eliminated.”54 This statement is completely consistent with
multilateralism by which no country becomes so dominant in a market that it infringes on
every other nation’s free access. And third, “German economic capacity must be
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converted in such a manner that it would be so dependent on imports and exports that the
country could not by its own devices reconvert to war production.”55 This is also a basic
tenant of multilateralism in which peace is guaranteed by the development of an interdependent world economy. Without a clear understanding of the State Departments
concept of global multilateralism, policy recommendations toward Germany may have
appeared to be punitive when they were not.
In September of 1944, Hull and the State Department still held hopes of breaking
up the British Imperial system. In many ways, this was of greater concern to the future of
multilateralism than a prosperous Germany. Hull wanted a multilateral European
continent including an economically viable Germany, but the long-time State Department
aim of bringing an end to the Ottawa Agreements was still of the highest priority.56 To
accomplish this goal, Hull would need the support of the president. Hull had hoped that
Roosevelt, who in the past had supported Hull’s free trade policy, would use his position
of power over the British to convince them to bring an end the Ottawa Agreements.
The agenda for the September 12, 1944, meeting between Roosevelt and
Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference, was intended to focus on military matters,
and thus Hull did not attend the conference.57 Halfway through the conference, Roosevelt
invited Morgenthau to attend and address German economic issues with Churchill and his
delegation. Both Roosevelt and Morgenthau were in agreement on both the postwar
treatment of Germany and the continuation of Lend-Lease aid to Britain. The objective
for the president was to get the British to agree to the Morgenthau Plan by the use of both
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the persuasion of Morgenthau, and the Treasury Department’s power of the purse.58 After
some coercion at the conference, the deal was made. Roosevelt was successful in getting
Churchill to sign an agreement endorsing Morgenthau’s Plan while Churchill received a
Lend-Lease commitment. Both the president and Morgenthau denied allegations of any
quid-pro quo agreement. In a State Department memorandum addressing the agreement
between the president and the prime minister, Morgenthau denied that there was any
connection between the prime minister’s acceptances of Treasury Department’s policy
for the harsh treatment of Germany and his success in obtaining a commitment from the
United States for a second phase of Lend-Lease funds,59 It seemed obvious to a skeptical
Hull and Stimson that such a deal had taken place.
The Quebec Agreement upset Hull who, referring to the cessation of the Ottawa
agreements, had a different set of priorities to negotiate with Britain. Hull remarked that
there were a number of matters with respect to commercial policy that the State
Department was working to get British concessions; however, because the president had
given in on Lend-Lease aid, there was no hope of settling these matters.60 At this time,
the long-term goal of opening up free trade with the British Commonwealth nations was
unlikely. The president had used his bargaining power to gain a policy goal that would
harm the long-term policy objectives of the State Department. In a meeting at Hull’s
office, comments made by Hull expressing his displeasure with Roosevelt were recorded
in the State department records.
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Secretary Hull was very disturbed by the fact that the President made the
decision on lend-lease with Britain without prior consultation with men
who had been working on the problem for a long time. He said that there
were a number of matters with respect to commercial policy which they
were trying to get from the British and which the British were running
away from, and that they were delaying decisions on the lend-lease aid to
Britain during Phase 2 in the hope of getting the other matters settled first.
Now, however, the President had given away that bait.61

Hull felt that Roosevelt had acted improperly. He had given away the prize with
no solid gain in return. Not only was the State Department neglected on the agreement,
there were no economists in attendance at the conference. Both Roosevelt and Churchill
approved the Quebec II agreement, which would have major implications for the postwar
economy, without any consultation with US or British economic experts or foreign policy
advisors.62 By October 1944, Hull accepted that Roosevelt would not reverse himself on
Germany. The signing of the Quebec II agreement by the president officially recognized
the Morgenthau Plan as US policy, but this did not deter the State Department from
working to moderate its effect.63 Over the course of winter 1944–1945, the State
Department tried to reassert and to refine its position in an attempt to work on the
Treasury’s influence.
The State Department was in a difficult position during the winter of 1944–1945.
After the Second Quebec Conference, Roosevelt turned his back entirely on all postwar
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planning.64 The president had done nothing to mediate the disagreement within his
Cabinet, and then firmly voted in favor of the Morgenthau plan. Since the start of the
dispute in August, all negotiations with the British and Soviet Allies over German policy
had been gravely hampered. Attempts by the United States to either influence their Allies
or to reach a consensus on postwar Germany had been frustrated.65 During this
environment of confusion, each Department did their best to influence the wording of
JCS1067 being prepared for the upcoming occupation.

The President’s Influence over Planning
President Roosevelt had the final say when it came to postwar policy. He often
acted as his own State Department. His lines of communications on foreign matters bypassed the State Department, and the ideas of the early postwar planners were definitely
not welcome at the White House. Roosevelt also ignored the negotiations done by interallied agencies, like the European Advisory Commission (EAC), relying more on a small
group of aids in the Executive Branch and personal friends.66 His list of trusted foreign
policy consultants and advisors, including Henry Morgenthau, Harry Hopkins, General
Marshall, and his Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy, was short.67 The insulated policy
generating environment created by the president left US planners and inter-allied
negotiators in a state of paralysis.
In 1944 and early 1945 the White House managed all the central threads of
German occupation planning. Implementation of policy was difficult because from the
64
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start of the war many of Roosevelt’s positions were either unknown or unclear to those
who had to execute them.68 He frequently had left the State Department uninformed on
major foreign policy matters. For example, in 1933, Roosevelt decided to recognize the
USSR without consulting the State Department; in 1943, Hull was not allowed to see any
of the conference notes from the Teheran Conference; and in 1944, at the Second Quebec
Conference, Roosevelt decided unilaterally that the Morgenthau Plan would be official
US postwar policy.69 After September 1944, the president had ostracized the State
Department to such an extent that any further policy rearguing Germany had to be cleared
with the Treasury Department.70 During this dark period, in the face of overwhelming
alienation, the State Department did not change its policy pursuits but did their best to
work from lower levels to influence the development of the directive.
It had been decided, at the Moscow Conference in 1943, to establish the European
Advisory Commission as the proper body to carry out negotiations over postwar German
matters. On several occasions during the tenure of the EAC; the negotiators were ready to
form a policy, but the White House held them at a standstill. Even though both the British
Foreign Office and the US State Department were in complete support of EAC
negotiations, it seemed conclusive that the president did not respect the policy-making
qualifications of the EAC.71 As late as October 1944, the president reported to Hull that
it was not advisable for the United States to make plans for a country that they did not yet
occupy. Also, the president advised Hull not to give any weight to the negotiations taking
place with our principal Allies. He reminded Hull that the purpose of the EAC was
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“Advisory” and they are not bound by their recommendations.72 This was Roosevelt’s
leadership style. He would make important decisions with a few close aids and preferred
to delay all decisions as long as possible. He rarely read or followed the advisement of
State Department memoranda, despite having no training in these difficult matters.73 The
president’s style and attitude had an adverse effect on how the Soviets and the British
approached the occupation. The postponement of major decisions had an undesirable
effect on postwar cooperation and was expected to have a detrimental effect on the
reconstruction of the German economy.
Roosevelt had only a passing interest in multilateralism. His postwar interests
were more selective than that of the State Department. His advocacy for free and equal
trade varied by circumstance.74 His main foreign policy agenda was dominated by a large
deference for the welfare of the British people. When it came to Hull’s principle on free
and unrestricted trade for all, including Great Britain and Germany, the president did not
agree. Great Britain would be allowed to keep its Imperial trading system, while
Germany’s industrial trade would have to be diminished.75 Roosevelt’s policy of picking
winners like Britain and losers like Germany for the postwar world was in direct conflict
with the multilateral principles laid down by the State Department.
It was predicable that the chaotic policy advanced by Roosevelt and Morgenthau
would lead to the collapse of the German economy and possibly much of Europe. Poor
planning would lead to a drain on US taxpayers and the potential starvation of thousands

72

State, “Foreign Relations of the United States. Conference at Quebec, 1944,” 358.
Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War, 575.
74
Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 17.
75
Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1948, 1620.
73

101
of Germans.76 This was the exact situation that State Department planners had been
working to avoid since 1939. Hull, Pasvolsky, Welles, and Bowman, despite their
individual feelings about Germans, believed that the opportunity for the United States at
the end of WWII should be used to do more than to just settle accounts.

JCS1067 and a Period of Deficient Planning
The end product of Roosevelt and Morgenthau’s punitive treatment for Germany
was the military directive JCS1067. As E.F. Penrose stated, “It was President Roosevelt’s
failure to adjudicate decisively between incompatible views among his Cabinet officers
that led to a “compromise” drawn up at “lower levels” which permitted large parts of the
Morgenthau Plan to creep in.”77 The process of writing JCS1067 was started in the fall of
1944 after the Second Quebec Conference, and over the next six months it went through a
series of revisions until it was given to US Occupation Commander in Germany General
Lucius D. Clay on April 26 1945.78 On that date, German deindustrialization and
economic chaos became official US occupation policy.
On November 30, 1944, Hull resigned as Secretary of State, succeeded by
Edward Stettinius, Jr. Because of Hull’s retirement, the State Department was at a
significant disadvantage during the process of creating JCS1067. Despite the change at
State Department, officials did what they could to weaken the overall concept of the
Morgenthau Plan. Alternatives offered to the text of the directive were subtle but
crucially different. McCloy, who worked in conjunction with the State and Treasury
Departments, finally settled for language that called for military control of the economy
76
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while taking no steps toward rehabilitation. 79 The wording may not have been favorable
to the State Department, but at least those at the War Department in charge of the
occupation were not in favor of destroying the German industry and had given
themselves enough flexibility room to maneuver.
Roosevelt and Morgenthau had hoped that the new directive could be applied to
all of Germany, but after it was presented at the EAC in spring of 1945, it was rejected by
Britain and the Soviets. As early as September of 1944, Dr. Pasvolsky was told by A.A.
Sobolev, Vice Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,
that “Mr. Morgenthau’s type of thinking was not acceptable to the Soviet Government.”80
At this time, both the United States and the Soviets had hopes of a united Germany under
their particular influence. Although in 1945 Soviet policy was not clear to the United
States, it should have been obvious that during the occupation, the Soviets could use
JCS1067 against the United States to gain support among the German people.
Despite the outcome of the Second Quebec Conference, the British also refused to
accept JCS1067 as a combined Anglo-American policy. In a memorandum prepared by
the Acting Secretary of State Stettinius on November 29, 1944, it was noted, “British
officials seem strongly opposed to sweeping measures of de-industrialization and extreme
impoverishment of Germany.”81 The British developed their own liberal directive
intending to preserve the basic structure of the German economy, a policy for which
Morgenthau severely criticized British officials.82 The British government was not in
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support of a punitive treatment for postwar Germany. The deal made between Churchill
and Roosevelt at Quebec was quickly rejected by London.83
As JCS1067 became available in the spring of 1945, the new president, Harry S.
Truman, supported Stimson and gave the military full authority to run the German
occupation. In April 1945, the final draft directive seemed much better to Stimson than
the earlier drafts. It did not approve action to strengthen the German economy but at least
it did not call for its destruction. McCloy made sure that the style of phrasing used would
give the military enough latitude and escape clauses to administer the occupation, as they
deemed necessary.84 The final version of JCS1067 was opposed by the State Department
and signified a policy victory for the Treasury Department. Morgenthau was happy with
JCS1067, later commenting that it included all the essential elements of the Morgenthau
Plan.85 With the Truman administration reliance on the War Department while trying to
gain control of the situation, the State Department under the new direction of Edward
Stettinius, Jr., was further removed from having significant influence over occupation
policy during the early days of postwar Germany.
JCS1067 was eventually abandoned as a policy in 1947. The directive was a
poorly conceived policy based on revenge. Lewis Douglas, appointed as economic
advisor to General Clay in April 1944, when first reading the directive was quoted, “This
thing was assembled by economic idiots”86 Douglas believed that the policy stipulated in
JCS1067 was unworkable in occupied Germany. His first assignment was to fly back to
Washington to try to get JSC1067 replaced. He was unsuccessful and, as a consequence,
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resigned his position. The implementation of Morgenthau’s policy built into JCS1067 at
the start the postwar German occupation was a tragedy. It dragged all of Europe down,
cost US taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, financed Soviets reparation removals
from Germany at the expense of the United States, and caused needless starvation and
poverty.
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Chapter IV
1945–1948: The Occupation Period
Redressing US Occupation Policy
The occupation of Germany was a period marked by changing policies. Despite
starting out as punitive, occupation policy gradually evolved to promote economic
prosperity. The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 was similar to the JCS1067 directive
drafted earlier that year; both projected a get-tough attitude. However, by 1947, the
United States was transitioning to a program of promoting prosperity, a policy position
similar to what was proposed by early postwar planners from the State Department. This
was not true of all policy issues. All US policy positions were critical of German
industrial cartels; therefore, policy toward cartels started out restrictive and remained that
way throughout the occupation period. When it came to policy addressing reparation
payments, industrial output, and separation of the Ruhr, US policy started out harsh and
moderated over time by limiting reparations, increasing industrial output, and opposing
separation of the Ruhr. Policy regarding the partition of Germany became more
complicated. Initially, the US Treasury Department favored the partition of Germany,
whereas the State Department was strongly opposed to partition. Over time, the State
Department increasingly found itself in support of partition, a change that would lead to
the eventual division of Germany. It did so to promote multilateral economic prosperity
in the part of Germany that was under the control of the United States. On every issue,
the eventual policy outcome was one that intended to maximize the implementation of a
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multilateral economic system in Germany along the lines of what was recommended by
the early State Department planners.
The central dilemma faced by the United States at the start of the occupation
period was that a potentially high-powered German industrial economy was both the
problem and the solution to postwar problems. At the end of WWII, there was a
legitimate concern that a dominant German industrial economy could again threaten
Europe. Official US policy linked peace and security with a crippled Germany. Many,
including those at the US State Department, recognized that a prosperous Europe could
be a peaceful Europe and that prosperity would depend on a strong German industrial
base. Various US governmental agencies struggled with both sides of this dilemma,
causing a bifurcated policy approach to be applied to Germany during the early
occupation period. While a punitive Potsdam agreement was officially in place, the US
War and State Departments increasingly implemented policy that would serve to revive
the German economy. As time went on, most US governmental departments were
increasingly sidestepping the application of official US policy.
The endorsement of JCS1067 in the first half of 1945 and the negotiations at the
Potsdam Conference by the Truman administration in the summer of 1945 overlooked the
importance of the German industrial economy to both the world and Europe. It was
unrealistic for US officials to think that the dynamic engine of German industry could be
either ignored or dismantled and sent to other European nations. During most of the
previous century, Germany played a central role in the European market. Throughout the
1920s, Germany was the leading consumer for goods produced by Italy and Switzerland,
the second best consumer for goods produced by Denmark, Holland, and the British Isles,
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and the third best consumer for goods produced by the United States. In the 1920s, the
United States exported more goods to pre-Nazi Germany than to all South American
nations combined.1 The State Department recognized that the US get-tough policy
underestimated Germany’s position in world markets. The historical scope of German
participation in the international economy was too important to be eliminated.
A key point argued by early postwar planners at the State Department was that a modern
prosperous world economy was multilateral in nature. JCS1067 and the Potsdam
Agreement disregarded this principle, ignoring the interconnectedness of German
industry both inside Germany and throughout the European continent. The
implementation of these two plans effectively cut off European trade from German coal
production and machine building industries; this severely limited the possibility of using
German trade to help rebuild the European economy.2 The division of Germany into
occupation zones by the Allies also crippled the movement of trade. US State Department
briefing papers created for the Potsdam Conference repeatedly warned of the serious
consequences if the German economy was not managed as a single economic unit.3 These
warnings were not taken seriously as the separation of Germany into four separate
occupation zones served to limited commercial activity. The German national economy,
which had been interdependent, was now divided and disconnected by four differing
occupational policies.
In 1945, at the start of the occupation, the US State Department had to take a
backseat to the War Department and the Executive Branch on policy matters concerning
1
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the German occupation. This was the case for a variety of reasons. First, there were
changes in leadership at the top levels of the US government. A new Secretary of State,
James F. Byrnes, was sworn into office in July 1945, and the Truman Administration,
which had been in office only a few months, was still trying to assert itself. Second, there
was already a strong military presence in place in Germany asserting its own agenda.
Finally, the State Department had just lost its interdepartmental struggle with the US
Treasury and Executive branches. These circumstances put the State Department in a
temporary position of weakness.4 This turned out to be a short-term setback, as State
Department policies gradually became more influential over the next two years. This
reversal occurred in three ways. First, over time, both the military personnel in Germany
and Executive Department officials in Washington were changing policy
recommendations to align closer to what the State Department had been advocating.
Second, State Department officials increasingly gained more direct responsibility for the
occupation. Finally, there was a change in the nature of the occupation as the focus of
policy on Germany changed from an interdepartmental disagreement within the US
government to an external struggle between the United States and its former Allies. This
change in the nature of the disagreement necessitated the United States to readjust its
policy closer to State Department recommendations.
By the start of the occupation, US State Department officials had spent a number
of years planning for the postwar period. They had anticipated major problems that other
US Government officials had not foreseen. Before JCS1067 and the Potsdam Conference,
they warned of a critical need for coal in Europe and expressed concerns that Germany
would be in a crisis condition if it was not be operated as a single economic unit. This
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was evident in policy briefing papers generated by the State Department for the Potsdam
Conference in July 1945.5 These documents pointed out that an adequate distribution of
coal was of key importance to all European countries. An acute shortage would be the
most important obstacle to economic recovery. Briefing papers recommended that a
maximum effort must be made to resolve the German coal problem as soon as possible.6
This documentation recommended that from 1945–1946, both German and Polish
production facilities would need to get back on schedule quickly to meet the continent’s
minimum needs. Four critical areas would need immediate and concurrent attention:
increased coal production, the revival of coal transportation, an increase in the general
level of the economy, and the nation-wide integration of the German coal industry.7
Briefing papers written for the Potsdam Conference detailed a knowledgeable
understanding by the US State Department of imminent problems that would be faced
during the occupation. They were remarkably consistent with multilateral policy plans
developed by the early planners at the State Department. While confirming that the needs
of Allied nations take precedence over the needs of Germany, they understood that the
general level of the entire German economy must be increased concurrently for all of
Europe to recover.
State Department Policy Briefing papers expressed concern over the possibility
that the occupation zones would act independently. They stressed that Germany must
operate as a single economic unit: “The division of Germany into zones of occupation
does not imply in the erection of barriers to the inter-zonal movement of goods.”8 The
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State Department warned that the operation of the zones as closed economic entities
would be utterly impracticable. In general, the US zone needed food, industrial materials,
and coal; the British zone needed food, but had an excess of coal and industrial materials;
and the Russian zone had an excess of food and coal.9 By the summer of 1945, the matter
of a unified Germany had not yet been raised by the Soviet Union, with the exception of
reparations. It had been evident since the Tehran Conference in December 1943 that a
main objective for the Soviets was a large reparations settlement. The operation of
Germany as a single economic unit could not be broached with the Soviets until they
received a suitable reparations deal.10 By June 1945, the Soviets had already taken large
quantities of reparations from their zone and were stalling further negotiations for the
economic unity of Germany until a suitable settlement was reached over reparation
removals from the Western zones.
At the start of the occupation period, critical policy decisions had been delayed,
and the possibility of a coal shortage and the economic partition of Germany was already
a concern at the State Department. Matters had already been delayed as a result of the US
interdepartmental disagreement over postwar policy. It appeared that a roadblock over a
Soviet reparations agreement was going to cause a further delay on important policy
decisions.11 Issues necessary for a viable German economy, such as the freedom of
movement, rebuilding a national transportation system, uniform ration scale, uniform
industrial and agricultural policies, centralized currency, and a national import-export
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agreement, had not yet been considered.12 As early as June 1945, State Department
briefing papers expressed apprehension about the urgency of these matters and further
delay would lead to economic partition. For the first time, the State Department
considered the possibility that an agreement with the Soviets might not be reached. The
urgency of these problems required the need for prompt decisions, even if it meant the
exclusion of the Soviets. Even before the Potsdam Conference, the State Department felt
that it would soon become necessary to make arrangements with other Allies, limiting
policy application to only the US and British zones.13 There was still hope that the
upcoming Potsdam Conference would address these issues, but the time was fast
approaching in which the Western Allies would have to act to unify economic activity
exclusively in their own Western zones to avert chaos and disorder.
There was a window of opportunity early in the occupation to solve these matters.
In the late spring and early summer of 1945, there was a great amount of goodwill toward
the Russians, and the attitude of the American people toward the Soviets at the time of
surrender was overwhelmingly optimistic. Many Americans felt that as a result of the
common cause and suffering, the two nations would come to agreement over the future of
Europe. Byrnes believed that at the end of the war, peace would be so deeply desired that
the Allies would have little difficulty in resolving European issues. The United States had
concerns over Soviet policy in Poland and Romania, but there was optimism that these
problems could be worked out.14 Despite concerns over the slow pace of negotiations, the
State Department felt positive that it might not be too late for cooperation on Germany.

12

State, “Foreign Relations of the United States,” 441.
Ibid., 607.
14
Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, 1st. ed (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 71.
13

112
Although officials at the State Department were the last US governmental agency
to lose hope in coming to an agreement with the Soviets, their feelings of optimism
turned out to be unrealistic. By early summer of 1945, problems were already starting to
develop. The State Department was not immune from criticism; it had been planning for
the long term and did not devote enough attention to short-term planning; the official
punitive policy in place made for a difficult start to the occupation. The authorities in
Washington who prepared JCS1067 did not grasp the realities of conditions in postwar
Germany. The initial problem was not that JCS1067 promoted a hard peace over a soft
peace; the problem was that conditions on the ground were much more challenging than
expected. State Department policy focused on trying to determine the exact level of
industry necessary to fit the German economy in its proper place among European
nations during normal times. The real focus should have been on preparing the economy
to recover as fast as possible in order to avoid a near-term economic disaster. JCS1067
called for the German economy to be controlled by the US military to only the extent
necessary to meet the needs of occupation forces and to prevent disease and unrest. The
directive gave limited authority to the Military government and prohibited any steps
being taken to rehabilitate or maintain the German economy.15 General Clay was blocked
from taking action on two fronts: (1) the restrictive nature of JCS1067 and (2) the Allied
occupational structure set up to run postwar Germany, the Allied Control Council (ACC),
called for a unanimous vote before any action could be taken.16 A single veto by any
Ally, British, Soviet, or French, could put a stop to any policy in Germany. Clay, who felt
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unable to intervene, understood that thousands of Germans would starve unless
immediate action was taken to revive industrial production.
After the first troubled year of occupation, Clay directed the US military to
produce the publication A Year of Potsdam, The German Economy Since the Surrender.17
In this publication, Clay was critical of how the Potsdam Agreement was harmful to the
postwar occupation of Germany. Much of the Morgenthau spirit survived after he left the
Treasury Department and had been written into the Potsdam Agreement.18 Potsdam
policy was aimed at destroying Germany’s import-export system by the use of industrial
restrictions and by overzealous reparation removals. In a response to this problem, the
publication was used by US military officials to argue that Germany had always been
heavily dependent on imports and its economy based on a system of combining German
labor with imported raw materials to manufacture finished machinery and metals. The
end of WWII had brought on a complex problem of reviving foreign trade in a defeated
and bankrupt nation. The removal of capital equipment had been targeted at Germany’s
most productive industries. If its traditional heavy industrial base were to be destroyed, it
would end Germany’s ability to become self-sufficient.19 The War Department was
looking to free itself from the restrictions of JCS1067 and the Potsdam Agreement. With
the use of this publication, Clay was seeking unrestricted authority to revive the German
economy to the fullest extent. This would serve to make the military’s job easier, reduce
the burden on US taxpayers, and allow Germany democratic forces an easier time in
resisting Soviet influence. The policy position of Clay and the US military was different
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than the policy position of the State Department.20 The State Department was in favor of
a revival only to a certain degree, to be used for the purpose of rebuilding all the nations
of Europe, a multilateral prosperity for victors and vanquished alike.
Changes in US policy between 1945 and 1947 were gradual. Even though
Morgenthau resigned from the Treasury in the summer of 1945, vestiges of the
Treasury’s putative influence remained strong among the lower ranks for the first two
years of occupation.21 Reparation policy during the early occupation period was still
operating under the shadow of a Morgenthau-type de-industrialization. It was not until
the folly of trying to run a balanced German economy while shipping off German
industrial capital to the Soviets that the punitive policy was perceived as a serious
mistake. When faced with what appeared to be a complete collapse of the German
economy, many occupation officials who started out determined to destroy Germany’s
industrial capacity steadily evolved into advocates of economic recovery.22 By 1946,
State Department officials and the US military started to work for solutions. In April
1946, Clay made the first bold move by stopping all dismantling of German industry for
shipment to the Soviets.23 Then he used his influence to change the structure of British
coal production in the Ruhr. Whereas both the United States and Britain agreed that more
German coal was urgently needed to revive the European economy, they differed on how
the Ruhr coal production should be administered. The British insisted that the Ruhr be
nationalized, while US officials held that coal mines would operate more productively if
they remained under private ownership and were run by experienced German executives.
20
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A decision was made on September 10, 1946 in favor of Clay’s position; the Ruhr’s coal
industry would not be nationalized but returned to German management as a means to
boost output.24 The change to German management and control was done to maximize
coal production in the Ruhr. By 1946, the need to change policy was driven more by
economic urgency than by political objectives.
By 1947, it became evident to the State Department that the United States had
grossly underestimated the destruction of the European economy by the war. “We failed
to take fully into account the effects of economic dislocation on productionnationalization of industries, drastic land reform, severance of long-standing commercial
ties, disappearance of private commercial firms through death or loss of capital.”25
Europe was steadily deteriorating; by 1947, malnutrition had peaked, and millions of
people in German cities were slowly starving.26 The modern division of labor system in
Europe had broken down. Nations were still running continual deficits. In 1946, the
United Kingdom had a balance of payments deficit of 2¼ billion, France 1¼ billion, Italy
½ billion, and in the US occupied German zone ½ billion.27 It had been two years since
the end of the war and a corner had not yet been turned. Economies in Europe were
deteriorating, and the hope of reassembling a multilateral trade system among nations had
not yet been realized.
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Eliminating German Cartels
Before multilateral foreign trade could be restarted, the problem of controlling
German industry had to be solved. German industry was not going to be allowed to
become the master of the Europe continent. To varying degrees, the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviets all believed that the social structure of industry in Germany was
the major cause of economic aggression.28 The persistent power of German elites and the
monopoly capitalists had the retarded the nations democratic development. The problem
accelerated after WWI as control of the German economy became increasingly
concentrated in the hands of a few people. This went beyond just the means of production
ownership; the structure in Germany involved a collaborative and cohesive economic
empire, a nefarious partnership of private business and a militaristic government.29 The
United States was of one mind on this point, the concentrated structure of the German
economy was inconsistent with the future of peace and democracy, and the job of the
occupation forces was to disassemble that structure.
Large industrial firms were a primary target of the occupation; the larger the firm,
the more intense the scrutiny.30 German cartels were a particular concern because of their
horizontal control of broad markets. All branches of the US government stood firm and
unanimous against this form of market control. The United States held a unique view on
industrial concentration. Unlike the British and the Soviets who accepted the usefulness
of large blocks of economic concentration for use as agents of social reform, the United
States worked to reduce all institutions of economic concentration for the prerequisite of
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promoting competition.31 All US occupation policymakers agreed on this particular issue.
Large concentrations of economic power were to be broken up, and all cartels and cartellike organizations were to be disbanded.32 Postwar Germany was to be decentralized by
the elimination of excess concentration of economic power comprised of cartels, trusts,
and monopolies.
US officials did not view cartels as dynamic and efficient; they viewed them as
archaic. Cartels blocked the diffusion of efficient technologies, stifled innovation, and
created a dangerous authoritarian power structure within the economy.33 They eliminated
horizontal diversification and limited the ability of market forces to work the benefit of
the general public. Cartels catered production to the needs of the elite; their elimination
would go a long way to change the structure of the German economy. Through the
process of decartelization, German capitalism could be restructured to resemble US
capitalism, the mass production of standardized goods for mass distribution. US policy
was predicated on the establishment of an egalitarian economy as a necessary step toward
a more democratic German society.
There were two different ways in which US policy makers viewed the relevance
of German industry; some felt that because of its centralized and monopolistic nature,
German industry was artificial and not vital to Europe. The Potsdam Agreement, which
had little input from the State Department, was based on this presumption. The claim of
“artificial” was based on the belief that the strength of German industry was due to the
exclusion of foreign competition by the use of import duties and its prominence inflated
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by use of political coercion.34 The economic rationale behind the Potsdam Agreement
argued that the breakdown of the international economic system during the 1930s was
due to a coercive German industrial structure that dominated the European market. In a
free and competitive economy, German industry would not be able to compete. The
Potsdam agreement called for this industrial structure to be disassembled and relocated
elsewhere in Europe.
Other policy makers like those in the US State Department believed that German
industry held a vital place in the European economy and was essential to its prosperity.
Germany’s central position in Europe, its excellent railway network, communication
systems, and strong domestic markets made it naturally strong and competitive. When
you add its coal resources, rivers and canals, and the industrial skills developed during
the last few generations you have all the essential ingredients for a vibrant economy.35
US officials at the State Department who held this view believed that Germany should be
reorganized, not dismantled. They believed that the German industrial system was the
center around which the European system moved.36 In short, remove the cancer (cartels),
and the patient (Germany) could be saved.
In the summer of 1945, the United States launched a rigorous attack on German
cartels.37 Paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Declaration stated that the German economy
would be decentralized to eliminate excessive concentrations of economic power held by
cartels, trusts, and monopolies.38 I.G. Farben, the world’s largest chemical company and
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Hitler’s major producer of war material, known as a “State within a State,” was forced
out of existence. US occupation officials took control of 42 of its manufacturing plants,
dissolved the firm, and then reorganized it into 52 independent operations. By 1946,
occupation forces had terminated 1,000 cartel and restrictive trade practices.
Decartelization policy remained a priority throughout the occupation period. The criteria
used to define a firm as a cartel were based on its number of employees. Law 56, passed
by US occupation forces in February 1947, required any firm headquartered in the US
zone having over 10,000 employees be deconcentrated unless given a specific exemption
by the military government. A similar law was concurrently enacted in the British zone.39
Some other firms that were broken up included major Ruhr steel producers, like Vestag
and Krupp, and the six largest banks, including Deutsche, Dresdner, and Commerz
Banks.40
There was a great expectation on the part of US officials that decartelization
would be a major feature in the reorganization of the German economy. All sides in the
US policy debate were in favor of this policy. The United States had a recent history of
trust-busting legislation; it was seen as a necessary historical process that German
capitalism had not gone through yet. Evidence of this deeply held conviction could be
seen in a report issued in the summer of 1945 by the US Senate Committee on War
Mobilization. They were investigating the possibility that German conspirators were
attempting to create economic reserves inside and outside Germany for another attempt at
world conquest. The committee was concerned that if Germany was not changed, they
would soon start WWIII. The committee’s final recommendation was that pressure be put
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on US occupation forces to thoroughly complete the decartelization of the German
economy.41 The conviction of the committee that cartels were a prime force behind Nazi
aggression and that a systematic removal of industrial cartels would ensure the peace is
an example of how firmly US officials held this view.
Germany Moves Toward a Crisis
At the start of the occupation period, the foreign policy apparatus of the United
States was adrift. President Truman was inexperienced in foreign affairs, Byrnes was
essentially a domestic politician, and there was an unsettled departmental disagreement
that carried over from the Roosevelt administration. There was no one document or paper
that spelled out a comprehensive policy toward Germany. There was no one leader, like
Stalin for the Soviets, who dominated national policy decisions. Byrnes was not a
forceful leader, he believed that the State Department should limit itself strictly to
policymaking and not become involved in the control of occupational organizations.
Byrnes was willing to let the State Department stand back from the occupation; the State
Department would recommend policy, the president would determine policy, and the War
and Navy Departments would execute policy.42 This was a responsibility that many in the
military were reluctant to take, and those who did accept responsibility, like Clay, had
their own ideas on how to run the German occupation. The second level of the State
Department was comprised of a new group of officials who were committed to taking up
the ideals of the early postwar planners. Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton,
Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman, and Reparations Ambassador Edwin Pauley

41
42

Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany, 43.
Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, 244.

121
all believed in the primacy of economic policy and the multilateral ideal.43 As the
occupation continued, this group of officials became more influential and pushed US
policy toward a multilateral promotion of German prosperity.
When Clay left Washington on April 6, 1945 to take over command of the
German occupation, he was not given any State Department briefings or policy papers to
review.44 He did not receive a copy of JCS1067 until after he arrived in Germany. This
lack of policy briefing was not of great concern to Clay; he found the conditions on the
ground in Germany so bad that short-term directives and long-term policy would take a
backseat to immediate relief. The situation in Germany was unprecedented, Assistant
Secretary of War John McCloy referred to it as “The most complete economic and
political collapse in modern times.”45 From the military’s perspective, the responsibility
to carry out short-term policy, namely JCS1067, in itself was unrealistic. In the face of
the destruction of war, just keeping the situation from degrading into chaos would be
difficult. For the military officials in charge of the day-to-day operations, long-term goals
were irrelevant and short-term planning was inadequate.
Cooperation between the Military and the State Departments in Germany got off
to a slow start. Because of the need for immediate action, Clay and the military drifted
toward a unilateral policy to keep the US zone afloat. Over time, Clay continued to
practice a wide range of decision-making latitude to allow the military occupation to
sustain. During the first two years of occupation, a number of decisions were made to
improve the overall economic situation in Germany; however, some came at the expense
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of other European nations. Clay’s unilateral action was starting to become a problem; it
was at odds with long-term State Department policy, which was based on the concept that
before any action was taken in Germany, it should first be considered for its effects on
the whole of Europe. By 1947, the State Department began to reassert itself. They urged
that policy should be directed to the creation of an all-European economic organization
designed to accelerate the lagging reconstruction and to achieve a greater long-run
economic unity in Europe.46 Policy from 1945 to 1947 was in a constant state of
transition. Clay and the military were developing unilateral decisions to promote a
successful occupation. Meanwhile, as the State Department began to regain its influence,
it began working toward the long-term goal of rebuilding Europe as an integrated whole.
During the first two years of the occupation, US policy for Germany was
bifurcated for a number of reasons. First, while Clay and the military were implementing
short-term policy for reconstructing the German economy, the State Department was
interested in changing the nature of the slow-moving German recovery from unilateral to
multilateral. Second, the State Department was still trying to work with the Soviets to
unify Germany; a consequence of this strategy was the willingness by the State
Department to delay the full recovery of the German economy until unification could be
achieved.47 Third, the long-term goal of redeveloping the international commercial
system on an egalitarian basis preempted any notion of a speedy recovery for Germany.48
Finally, there was pressure by Congress to bring the troops home and cut occupational
expenses. Roosevelt had told Stalin in 1944 that the United States would only leave
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troops in Europe for two years. The Truman administration, also very concerned about
finances, was apprehensive about providing financial support for the US occupation zone
while sending reparations to the Soviets.49 Clay was well aware of these feelings in
Washington and, consequently, one of his paramount concerns was to make Germany
self-sufficient to keep costs down to US taxpayers and permit a timely American
withdrawal. By 1947, a crisis was developing in Germany, one that would unify US
policy under the guidance of the State Department.
1947 was a turning point for the occupation of Germany. The winter of
1946–1947 had been the worst in decades; it was a time of crisis as the German people
were running out of coal and food. Both the military occupational authorities and the
State Department recognized that mistakes had been made. The United States had to
reverse course and save as much of Germany as possible.50 Coal and food production
needed to be increased, industrial production needed to be expanded to help pay for
imports, and a new policy would have to be developed to save the Western zones, even if
it meant the partition of Germany. The State Department was forced to reevaluate its
broad stance for European redevelopment and focus on economic development for
Germany. This change can be identified by changes in policy toward the control of the
Ruhr, reparation deliveries to the Soviets, and the level of German industrial production.
The hardening of US policy in relation to these issues was bound to cause problems
during the ongoing negotiations with the Soviets.
The major difficulty for the occupation was doing business with the Soviets who
were antagonistic to multilateral economic policy. At the start of the occupation, State
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Department policy anticipated cooperation with the Soviets on trade. In July 1945,
Byrnes stated, “It is of course a prime objective of this Government to include the Soviets
in any organization having to do with production, export, or allocation of German coal.”51
Coal was the prime concern for the economy and the United States was eager to trade for
Soviet zone coal. However, after two years, no progress had been made, and as a result,
the United States was losing its willingness to negotiate. By 1947, Byrnes’ comments on
Soviet cooperation had completely reversed: “They want to share in all decisions on the
allocation of Ruhr products. Our experience on the Allied Control Council demonstrates
how impractical this proposal is.”52 By 1947, the Soviets felt they had been betrayed by
the United States on reparation deliveries from the Western zones; they were not going to
negotiate free trade for Germany until they received a suitable reparations agreement.
The United States was committed to not giving in to reparations until there was free trade
in all of Germany. An impasse had been reached in negotiations; if the Soviets would not
supply coal from East Germany, they could not expect to have any control over the
industrial production from the Ruhr.
The United States’ inability to open up all of Germany to free trade led directly to
a change in policy on sending the Soviets reparations. This change had a longstanding
impact on the future of Germany and increased the level of tension between the United
States and the Soviet Union. At Potsdam, the United States had agreed to send the
Soviets 10 percent of the industrial capacity of the Western zone within two years,
assuming a united German economic system. After nine months and no Soviet
cooperation on trade, Clay took a hard stand by designating that until the Soviets opened
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up trade with the East, there would be no reparations from the West.53 The position was
firm. The United States would not pay for reparations again as it had after WWI. German
capital equipment could not be given to the Soviets while the American taxpayer was
paying for the support of the US zone. The United States then implemented the “First
Charge Principle,” meaning that proceeds from exports of current production would first
go to pay for needed imports, not to pay for Soviet claims.54 It was possible that the
United States may have to finance German reconstruction in its own zone, but it would
not pay for reconstruction in the Soviet zone. To save the Western zones of Germany, the
United States would have to divide it from the Eastern zone. Division was not the initial
desire of anyone at the State Department, but if the Soviets would not allow Germany to
integrate as one economic unit, then the United States would have no option but to
integrate a separate West Germany economy exclusively with other Western economies.
As the occupation preceded, it became clearer to the State Department that plans
to keep the German economy at a managed level of production were unworkable. State
Department documents from before 1947 advocated for a moderately prosperous German
economy, but accommodated the concerns of other nations over the potential of a
renewed German threat by limiting German industrial production. However, by 1947,
there was no longer a concern for a German threat; therefore, there was no need to restrict
German industrial production. Briefing papers were calling for urgent action to increase
the production of coal, food, and consumer goods.55 The United States were calling for an
increase in the German standard of living equal to their European neighbors as a
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necessity for the development of a prosperous and democratic Germany.56 As hopes for a
multilateral vision for all of Europe ran into Soviet resistance, the United States had to
retool its policy to restart the German industrial machine to benefit a stagnate Western
European economy.
Policy concerning the control of the Ruhr was the subject of intense negotiation
during the occupation period. In 1945, the French and some US officials wanted the Ruhr
to be separated from the rest of Germany. Others, including the Soviets recommended
that it be turned over to international ownership.57 Other forms of control over the Ruhr
were being discussed. Both Clay and officials at the State Department contended that
Germany without the Ruhr could not be self-sustaining and that detachment would be
contrary to the political and economic stability of Europe. US officials also believed that
the population of the Ruhr would most likely be agitated until it was reunited with
Germany.58 By 1947, the United States had ruled out both the separation of the Ruhr
from Germany and international ownership, but it did call for international supervision of
the Ruhr resources to ensure equal access to all nations.
By the fall of 1947, the US State Department realized that early occupation
policy designed to force the Soviets to accede to cooperation in Germany by withholding
payments of reparations, denying Soviet control over resources from the Ruhr, or
manipulating the level of industrial production, had failed. The result was the separation
of the Soviet zone from the US, British, and French zones.59 If the Soviets continued to
oppose multilateralism, they would do so under economic handicap of exclusion from the
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Western European market. Conversely, the United States was willing to use its superior
economic position to support Germany and other European nations willing to include
their economies in a multilateral system. The State Department was the last US
Department to give up hope for a united Germany, but once they realized they could not
coerce the Soviets into multilateral participation in Germany, it was time to cut loose
from the negotiations.
US Policy and the Division of Germany
At the start of the occupation, the US State Department advised against the
partition of Germany.60 State Department briefing papers issued in July 1944 for the
Potsdam Conference recommended that the United States should strongly oppose the
partition of Germany. There were many reasons given: partition would break up
Germany as an economic unity, it would be dangerous to the future peace in Europe, the
current occupation zones would not work as plausible partition lines, and partition would
have to be maintained by force. The State Department asserted that the Germans had
become increasingly homogenous and would try to reunite. Most importantly, partition
would be injurious to the rehabilitation of Europe and cause further expense for the
United States.61 The Soviets were also interested in the possibility of a united Germany;
they had hopes of fostering Soviet influence over the entire country. Soviet promised that
cooperation would be forthcoming if they would receive continued reparations payments
from the Western zones and had access to a share of recourses from the Ruhr. Only in
1948 did the Soviets finally abandon the idea of a united Germany.62 At a speech given in
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Stuttgart in September 1946, Byrnes restated future policy toward Germany, “The United
States shall do everything in its power to secure the maximum possible unification.”63
Even though Clay had stopped reparations deliveries to the Soviets in the spring of 1946,
it was not done with the intension of dividing Germany. It was an action taken by US
military officials to improve conditions in the western zone. As of 1946, the US military
was still determined to make cooperation with the Soviets work.64 It was in the last half
of 1946 that policy changed from cooperation to obstruction and hopes for a united
Germany started to unwind.
There is much debate as to who was responsible for the division of Germany, but
it seems clear that reparations were at the heart of the issue. Both sides were unsure of the
other’s intentions. Both sides started the occupation with high hopes of a united Germany
under the auspices of their own particular influences. The Russians placed a tremendous
value on Communist success in Germany.65 They believed that a postwar Germany was
predisposed to become a communist nation, especially if the Soviets were in a position to
influence local officials. The United States was determined that Germany should be part
of a US lead multilateral group of capitalist nations. Some level of socialism would be
acceptable, but national trade policy was to be open and free. The first priority for the
Soviets was reparations, and until they received a suitable agreement, they would insist
on a separation of zones. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed that the
Soviets were playing a waiting game; they would keep a firm control over the Eastern
zone until a time came when the United States pulled out, and then a united Germany
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under Soviet influence would become a possibility.66 There seemed to be no solution to
the US-Soviet deadlock.
The Soviets and the United States were not the only foreign powers with concerns
about the German settlement. State Department preparation papers for the Moscow
Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in March 1948 reveal deep concerns about
French obstruction to German economic unity. The French continue to veto any policy
that would allow for central German authority. They have been the most determined
opponent of economic unification of Germany and the establishment of central German
agency. They will not likely relent until the Ruhr issue is settled.67 The French were not
included in the Potsdam Conference and did not consider themselves bound by the
agreement. At the start of the occupation, the French wanted the Ruhr separated from
Germany, but by 1948, they had become willing to talk about other options, such as
internationalization of the Ruhr.
By 1947, the issue of the Ruhr became central. The United States had staked its
hope for future European prosperity on this rich industrial district. Despite concerns over
a renewal of German economic power in Europe and the Soviet desire to gain access to
the its industrial output, the United States became steadfast in its determination to find a
solution to using the Ruhr’s industrial output to revive Western Europe. US State
Department documents addressed these policy concerns: “unfettered German control of
the vital coal and iron and steel resources of the Ruhr would leave many European
countries which are deeply dependent on the Ruhr at the mercy of Germany.” However,
“Means must therefore be found to reconcile the varying interests of European countries
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in the export of Ruhr coal and steel.”68 Policy concerning the Ruhr followed a similar
transformation to other policy over German economic prosperity. Early apprehension
over German industrial power gave way to a policy that promoted both a prosperity and
multilateralism, which was inclusive of Germany.
At the Moscow CFM in March 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov stated his nation’s position—German economic unity and a reparations
agreement were inseparable. Molotov complained that the Soviets were being excluded
by the United States from forming economic ties to the Ruhr and its rightful claim to
reparations. Molotov conferred that the Soviet Union was ready to account for every
kopek of reparations removed from the Eastern zone and that Potsdam did not prohibit
reparations from German current production. The Soviets were not willing to agree to the
economic unity of Germany until quadripartite control of the Ruhr was established.69
Molotov’s complaint seemed reminiscent of one that Ribbentrop and Mussolini had
registered during the early stages of WWII. As an economic superpower, the United
States had the power to set the rules for the global market and the ability to set
boundaries, which could include or exclude other nations.
The final act of the division of Germany was the West German currency reform in
June 1948. Economic recovery was impossible unless the inflationary effect of a
worthless currency was replaced with a new currency issued on a bizonal basis.70 The
new currency was printed for the Western zones only, definitively separating the
economy of the Western zones from the Eastern zones. This was a purely Western Allied
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measure and was an unmistakable sign that any hope of unification was over.71 By 1948,
the United States had completely changed its policy and currency reform, halted
reparation payments to the Soviet, and denied Soviet participation in the Ruhr, all severed
to divide Germany for the purpose of the restoration of economic prosperity in the
Western zones.
A “West” German Recovery
The story of postwar Germany, at least for the Western portion, was a story of
struggle at first and then recovery. In 1920, John Maynard Keynes wrote in Economic
Consequences of the Peace, “Round Germany as a central support the rest of the
European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of
Germany the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended. The increasing
pace of Germany gave her neighbors an outlet for their products, in exchange for which
the enterprise of the German merchant supplied them with their chief requirements at a
low price.”72 However, in 1948, after 34 years of war and suffering, Germany’s reluctant
neighbors would have to be willing to accept its return to free and independent status;
Europe’s prosperity depended on it.73 Besides the pressure exerted by the United States,
there were other forces helping to push Germany’s acceptance into the European
market.74 The slow rate of recovery during the first few years of the occupation and the
increasing sense of a Soviet threat helped to persuade Germany’s European neighbors
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that a strong and democratic West Germany under the tutelage of the United States was
the best hope for a peaceful and prosperous Europe.
By 1948, two and a half years of occupation had passed, and recovery in both
Germany and Europe was stalled. Germany had been divided clearing the way for the
application for multilateralism among the Western Allies. A European market, which
included West Germany, would now be given a chance to fulfill the expectations of
recovery. A new set of State Department officials could finally take the lead and set in
motion the proposals of early postwar planners, reviving Western Europe with the
creation of a multilateral commercial system.
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Chapter V
1947–1948: An Integrated West Germany
Introduction
The start of the Cold War coincided with the emergence of a Western-orientated
multilateral world economy. By 1947, it became clear to US officials that the German
problem, the economic unity of the German nation, was not solvable, but that the
European problem, rebuilding a prosperous European economy, was. The economic
recovery of a united Germany was being prevented by a policy conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union, with no foreseeable solution in sight. The division of
Germany into East and West was predicated by the necessity of Western powers to close
off their zones from the Soviet zone to secure multilateralism and, thus, prosperity. By
1947, the nature of partition had changed. Before 1947, partition signified a division of
the nation of Germany; from 1947 on, partition signified the separation of an
international capitalist Western economy from Soviet controlled Eastern European
economy. Multilateralism was initially intended by the US State Department to include
most of the world; by 1948 they had to accept a smaller region that excluded the Soviets
and Eastern Europe. The Cold War partition had implications beyond the German border,
West Germany became more than just a dividing line between East and West; it
developed into the centerpiece of what was to become a Western European economic
engine.
George C. Marshall was sworn in as Secretary of State in January 1947. His main
objective was to find a solution for the crisis in Europe. The ongoing economic
stagnation of Europe was raising concerns within the US government about an advance
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of communist influence on the continent. One of the first measures taken by Secretary
Marshall was the creation of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) under the direction of
George F. Kennan. The purpose of the staff was to create foreign policy
recommendations for the crisis in Europe. Kennan, an acknowledged Soviet expert, was
directed to develop a European Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP would be a departure
from the piecemeal approach to handing out aid; participants would have to organize the
rehabilitation of the continent on an integrated basis. It became a turning point in US
foreign policy because for the first time, the United States forcefully injected itself into
European affairs during peacetime by granting large amounts of financial aid.1 At
Kennan’s recommendation, US policy was not to be directed at combating communism,
but to restore the economic health of Europe. Aid to Europe was formulated with
initiatives that required economic multilateralism, not ideological preconditions; Europe
was to be saved by economic collaboration and free trade. The goal of the ERP can be
recognized as the aspiration of what early postwar planners at the State Department had
first recommended in 1939.
The ERP was made available to all nations of Europe, including the Soviets.
Marshall, along with other State Department officials questioned Kennan’s
recommendation allowing for Soviet participation. They were concerned that Soviet
involvement would sabotage the program, but Kennan urged Marshall to play it straight
and extend the offer to Stalin.2 This was a difficult proposal for Marshall to accept, as the
need to develop an ERP for Europe was caused by an unyielding Soviet policy in
1
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Germany to some extent. The Soviets had been acting without regard for the other
occupation zones and were enforcing closed economic polices elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. It was during the ERP negotiations that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov
challenged the US State Department’s approach of an integrated multilateral European
reconstruction program. Molotov insisted on a nation-based approach. Aid should be
allocated to individual counties, without multilateral strings attached. Molotov and Stalin
were not interested in free trade and knew that in an open-door competition, their county
was no match for the American economic juggernaut.3 The development of the ERP
highlighted the friction between the United States and the Soviets over the role of
Germany in European redevelopment. Were the economic resources of Germany to be
used to rebuild Europe or the Soviet Union?
When it came time to negotiate over ERP funding, the Soviets were not the only
nations reluctant to think beyond their own nationalist goals. In the summer of 1947,
sixteen nations met in Paris to form the Committee of European Economic Co-operation
(CEEC), an organization formed to make recommendations as to the nature and
disbursement of ERP aid. During negotiations, it became evident that most nations were
still mired in nationalism. They sought out funds with the intent of improving their
position among their fellow nations. CEEC committees could not come to agreement on a
European wide policy that would transcend individual nationalistic priorities.4 When it
came to Germany, Clay and the military were not immune from this position; they
insisted that Germany should be administered as a separate and special recipient of ERP
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funds.5 General Clay was concerned that Germany’s neighbors would design a plan that
would be a detrimental to the recovery of West Germany. He was correct in his
assessment; the initial CEEC recommendations called for a recovery rate for Germany
that was too low.6 Nearly all the policy recommendations made by the sixteen CEEC
members did not meet with US State Department approval and had to be reworked to fit a
the proposed multilateral structure.
US occupation forces were not inclined to promote multilateral policy in
Germany. From the start of the occupation, Clay preferred to approach economic
problems from a German as opposed to a European perspective. An increasing level of
antagonism with the Soviets compounded this dilemma. Daily decisions were made on
the basis of short-term results with the intention of alleviating the occupation’s financial
burdens. US State Department records point to disagreements over the application of
funds between the military and the State Department during the first three years of the
occupation. State Department documents report, “Issues which have arisen involved the
rather narrow view of German interests taken by the Army Department, restricted as it is
by the specific purposes for which its funds were appropriated, as against the Department
of State’s interest in over-all western European recovery.”7 As difficulties with the
Soviets increased in Germany, there was concern at the State Department over the
expanding influence of the War Department over foreign policy. With the focus shifting
from economic to military issues, State Department planners were concerned that they
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had little say in shaping occupation policy.8 As the crisis in Berlin drew closer, it became
necessary to leave Clay and the military in charge although their ideas clashed with the
State Department’s.9 There were some positive, unintended consequences for the German
economy as a result of the confrontation with the Soviets. As tensions with the Soviets
increased, American military officials were able to justify accelerating industrial
production in the Ruhr and other sectors in the Western zones. Eventually, Washington
was able to legitimately override concerns from France and other European nations about
increasing German production under the portent of a looming Soviet threat.
In January 1948, Secretary Marshall announced that the State Department was
ready to take over control of the occupation in Germany. Although this had been a longterm goal of both the Army and State Departments, the timing seemed premature.10 1948
turned out to be a year of dramatic change in Germany as the Soviets were increasingly
left out of policy planning made among Western European allies. February saw the start
of the London Six Power Conference, which included the United States, France, Great
Britain, and the Benelux countries, but excluded the Soviet Union. These talks led to the
formation of West Germany. In March, the first forms of the Soviet blockade of Berlin
started. In June, a separate currency reform was rolled out in the Western zones. Finally,
in September, a parliamentary council assembled in Bonn to draft a constitution for a
West German government. Clay, who had expected to be leaving Germany by 1948, was
asked to stay because of the escalation of tensions.
The increasing potential for hostilities with the Soviets changed the nature of the
so-called German problem. Starting in 1947, Germany’s neighbors began to realize that
8
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they might have to accept a stronger Germany as a buffer to Soviet power. Because of
Germany’s recent history of military aggression, Germany’s neighbors were wary of
accepting its return to independent status. At the end of WWII, there was a great potential
for Germany to return to a position of strength, and its citizens seemed willing to make
the necessary sacrifices to rebuild its industrial economy. Germany possessed a large
industrial capacity that was ready to take full advantage of any spike in foreign demand.
German workers were willing to contribute to the reconstruction of Germany by
accepting lower wages, thereby creating higher profit levels leading to an increase in
additional investment capital. The German middle-class was willing to accept a currency
reform by which small holders would lose their savings while the value of the industrial
capitalists remained unaffected. In the Western zones, the United States and Great Britain
had been leaving industrial capital largely intact.11 Conditions were different in East
Germany where the Soviets had been removing large amounts of industrial capital in the
form of reparations. As antagonisms with the Soviets mounted, US policy in the West
increasingly promoted economic prosperity; meanwhile, Soviet policy in the East was
promoting political solutions that would improve Soviet security.
The introduction of multilateralism into the European economic system through
the application of ERP aid was seen by the US State Department as a necessity, even if it
led to the eventual division of Germany. Kennan advised Marshall to leave the door open
to the Soviets and all of Eastern Europe to participate in the program, an option that
Kennan was sure Stalin would not take.12 Kennan knew that a multilateral form of
international commerce was inconsistent with Soviet policy. He felt strongly that the
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Soviets would never allow multilateral interaction between East European nations and the
West, and was therefore convinced that the Soviets would reject the plan.13 Stalin was
initially interested in negotiations for ERP aid but started to lose interest once he learned
that funds would be applied on a multilateral basis. The introduction of the ERP in 1947
meant that Stalin had to make a choice, either cooperate in a multilateral free trade
economy or have the eastern half of both Germany and Europe cutoff from a growing
Western prosperity.
State Department Policy: 1947–1948
1947 brought a sense of urgency to the conditions in Germany and Europe. In
May, Clayton returned from a tour of the region and was shocked by the breakdown of
economic activity. All US governmental officials familiar with the conditions felt the
situation called for immediate action. From the fall of 1946 through the spring of 1947,
there was a critical shortage of coal during what turned out to be an exceptionally cold
winter. This was compounded by a severe drought and a persistent food shortage.14 With
food shortages, coal shortages, and a lack of dollars to pay for imports, Western Germany
and much of Western Europe was on the brink of disaster. American officials grew
concerned that Europe would be vulnerable to communist influence.15 In response,
Truman called on the US State Department to act immediately and with substance.16 The
initial concept for the ERP originated in the economic section of the State Department in
1946, but it was the crisis of 1947 that brought on a sense of urgency. It was this
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heightened state of concern of the Truman Administration that pressured a fiscally
conservative Congress to allow the State Department to act decisively with substantial
ERP funding.17
The design and implementation of the ERP was dependent on multilateral
cooperation among European nations. Up until 1947, Soviet controlled Eastern Europe
had not acted in this manner. Kennan, who headed the PPS found himself responsible for
the articulation of American global policy, with the salvation of European capitalism as
his top priority.18 The PPS was immediately thrown into the ERP. Policy papers confirm
that by 1948 the State Department was abandoning its policy on German unification as a
necessary precondition of European recovery. Kennan had concluded that the failure to
treat Germany as an economic unit was the result of the Soviet Union refusing to
implement common policies with respect to foreign trade and reparation removals.
Because of the ERP, the emphasis of US policy with regard to Germany had to be
changed from active concentration on the achievement of economic unity to the full-scale
participation of bizonal Germany in the recovery of Western Europe. Kennan called for
an increase in the present levels of industrial production to double in order to meet the
new requirements.19 This was a decisive change in policy. Previously, the State
Department was willing to forego full-scale German industrial production for the
possibility of uniting Germany and the development of an egalitarian multilateral Europe.
However, Kennan pointed out that the prosperity of a multilateral Europe was dependent
on full-scale production in Germany and the US State Department was willing to divide
Germany to achieve this goal.
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By 1947, there was a convergence of support among US government departments
in favor of a proactive multilateral foreign policy for Western Europe, a formation in
which West Germany would play a leading role.20 Both the Executive and Legislative
branches supported multilateral policy. Congressional support for ERP funding depended
on a multilateral concept by stipulating that legislation must be framed as aid for Europe
and not a series of individual countries.21 The perception of a Soviet threat was a key
factor in the consolidation of US support for a proactive policy. By 1948, concerns by US
officials over Soviet influence in Europe helped to create a consensus, changing the tide
of support away from a fiscal conservative agenda to a foreign policy based on a
proactive multilateral approach to European affairs.
A central stipulation of US multilateralism was that Western European nations
must accept West German integration. Not all Europeans were in agreement on the
benefits of multilateral integration, especially with Germany. Considering the past thirty
years of history, many Germans and their neighbors were not willing to accept the
integration of the West German economy into Europe. In 1947, to many Germans,
integration meant granting license to France, Belgium, and Switzerland to use German
resources for their own benefit without corresponding benefits for Germany.22 Most other
European nations were looking for a sizable financial aid package before they would
agree to open up their national economies to international competition. When the US
State Department first announced the ERP, they expected Western European nations to
willingly help construct a plan that would ensure West German integration. PPS policy
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papers addressed this issue. Kennan wrote, “Our present objective is, together with the
United Kingdom and France, to reconstitute Western Germany as a political entity
capable of participating in and contributing to the reconstruction of Europe in respect to
economic life and the general security.”23 Despite early expectations of cooperation
among ERP participants, the State Department soon came to recognize that Western
European nations would not willingly give up economic sovereignty.
As late as 1947, a punitive JCS1067 was still the official policy position of the
United States. A new directive, JCS1779, released in July 1947, had been under
consideration since the summer of 1945. From 1945 through 1947, there had been a
gradual and unofficial transition of policy toward the promotion of German industrial
prosperity. At the time of Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech in 1946, much of JCS1779 was
already in effect. 24 It was likely that JCS1067 was kept in effect as a backup position
until the United States had a clearer understanding of Soviet motives. A punitive policy
would not be completely ruled out as long as there was a possibility of reaching an
agreement with the Soviets.25 The turning point for the official change in US policy came
in June 1947 when the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vjaceslav Molotov, walked out on the
Paris ERP negotiations. The United States and its Western allies then started to
coordinate an economic recovery without concern for the Soviet Union. Finally, in July
1947, with the release of JCS1779, the unofficial policy of restoring the German
economy became official.
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The ERP was the centerpiece of US postwar planning; its main goal was identical
to what early planners had in mind, an integrated system of trade liberalization. State
Department documents from 1948 assert “It is US policy that the fullest possible
recognition be given this interdependence in order to achieve the greatest over-all
benefits for the European Recovery Program.”26 For a variety of reasons, West Germany
was to play a central role in the implementation of this program. It had the industrial
potential to be the driving force behind European economic growth, it could be directly
influenced by the presence of US troops, and its economic development could be directed
by the US State Department.27 American funds were critical to restarting West Germany
commercial trade; from 1945–1948, the United States financed 66 percent of all German
imports, and 39 percent in 1949. This was important because, at the time, Germany did
not have the currency reserves to purchase the raw materials needed to restart its
equipment manufacturing industry.28 The reduction of trade barriers alone would not
restore a commercial system. Most economists at the State Department prescribed two
other ingredients: full employment and the application of ERP aid for a period of three to
four years.29 The main problem was that after the war, most nations had a poor balance of
payments, (i.e., they had little in currency reserves from which to pay for imports). ERP
funds were intended to bridge this gap by providing a much needed dollar reserve to be
used for international trade.
To further enhance commercial trade, in July 1945, the United States and its allies
formed the International Trade Organization (ITO), with the goal of releasing
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international commerce from the restraints of protectionism and tariff barriers. The State
Department was determined to gain West German inclusion in these international trade
organizations. State Department policy papers from 1948 recommended that the United
States sponsor German membership in the ITO and its successor organization General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These efforts initially failed, but the State
Department was successful in gaining most-favored-nation treatment for Germany from
other ERP members as a condition of their participation. In the meantime, the United
States was conducting trade with Germany in a manner that was in full accord with ITO
policies.30
Disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over the economic
development of Germany helped ignite the start of the Cold War. From 1945 to 1947,
policy toward Germany was still punitive in nature and did not seek partition. Even as
late as 1948, some State department officials, including Kennan, still held out some hope
for unification. The failure by this late date to produce a four-power agreement caused
the United States to reverse its policy stand.31 State Department policy papers from 1948
illustrate that the members of the PPS placed blame on the Soviet Union, stating, “It was
made clear that the price to be extracted of the Western powers for an agreed solution of
the German problem was Soviet-Communist control over the economic and political life
of all of Germany.”32 The inability to resolve this issue came to a head at the CFM
meeting held in London on December 1947, as an agreement was still out of reach. From
this point on, US policy was to pursue the division of Western German from the East
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with an emphasis on the development of a strong and independent West German state.
Officially, the United States had not given up hope of renewed four-power discussions in
the future, nor did it completely abandon hope for unification; however, the present
situation in Germany called for urgent solutions to economic and political problems.33
The United States government would no longer wait for an agreement to restore healthy
economic conditions in Germany.
By the summer of 1948, the new goal of the United States was to ensure that a
soon-to-be constituted West German state make a vital contribution to the economic
rehabilitation and political stability of Europe. Western Germany had to gain the
acceptance of the United Kingdom and France as a prerequisite before its integration into
a Western European economic system. The shared use of German recourses for the
purpose of creating a Western European prosperity was a critical inducement for West
German acceptance.34 From February through June of 1948, a Six-Power Conference was
held in London, specifically addressing the creation of the new West Germany state.
These talks included the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux
countries. The tone of the conference was set by a communiqué released in March 1948
and recommended that to confirm the availability of coal, coke, and steel to all of
Western Europe, it had been decided that there must be a close association between all
economies involved in the ERP. The Ruhr must not be separated from Germany, but an
agency, the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), must be created by the Six-
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Powers to control distribution and production of the Ruhr resources.35 This agency would
not include the Soviets, and thus a major obstacle in negotiations had been removed.
Control of the Ruhr could now be made within the confines of West European
considerations. By the exclusion of the Soviets, it was anticipated that agreements over
the distribution of resources from the Ruhr region would be easier to attain.
A new West German state combining the US, British, and French zones linked to
US multilateral policy objectives was taking shape. Under the recommendations of
Kennan and the PPS, the Western portion of Germany was removed from an ineffective
quadripartite control and was reconstituted as an independent nation back in pursuit of
economic prosperity closely aligned with the Western powers. PPS documents advised
that West German independence could only be accomplished by a complete withdrawal
from the Allied Control Council (ACC); therefore, the best policy path would be to
proceed with vigorous implementation of the London Conference recommendations.36
This new policy would directly undermine the authority of the ACC. On March 20, 1948,
the last ACC meeting was held and the Soviet representative, Vasily Sokolovsky, walked
out.37 This abrupt end to the ACC was due to Soviet resentment over their exclusion from
having any say in the distribution of resources from the Ruhr. The ACC was finished,
both the United States and the Soviet Union had undermined quadripartite control, and
the division of Germany was final.
No policy had done more to finalize the division of Germany than the
implementation in June of 1948 of a separate currency for West Germany; perhaps no
policy has been given more credit for German economic recovery than that same
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currency reform. Reconstruction took off after currency reform; it is often referred to as
“day one” of the new Germany.38 The new Deutschemark was not the origin of German
recovery, but it was a necessary prerequisite, a critical measure allowing a slow recovery
to gain momentum.39 The new functioning currency brought stability to the market place.
Shop owners could confidently stock their shelves, and industrial capitalists could
accurately calculate profits and make stable investment decisions. The psychological
impact of the currency reform combined with the knowledge of German participation in
the ERP added to a growing confidence in recovery.
The US State Department had been eager to create the new currency since 1946,
but it had to wait for the right time. Being in a powerful position as an occupier, it was
easier for the United States to enforce a new currency than for a democratically elected
German parliament. The opportunity presented itself in June 1948, immediately after the
breakup of the ACC. Without Soviet interference; the remaining Western allies had no
difficulty in agreeing on the terms. Initially, each German could exchange, on a one-toone basis, sixty old Reichsmarks for sixty new Deutschemarks. Subsequent exchanges of
old currency for Deutschemarks was limited to 100 to 6.5, eliminating 93.5% of old
currency.40 Many middle income Germans with money in the bank found that their
previous savings had been drained and replaced with a smaller starting amount of the new
currency. Industrialist’s had a strong financial incentive to support currency reform. It
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heavily favored capital owners whose fixed capital assets were unaffected by the
conversion.41
With the onset of the Soviet blockade in the summer of 1948, Berlin became the
symbolic focal point in what was to become the Cold War. In the spring of that year,
Clay had expressed his confidence to Secretary Marshall that as long as the United States
held its ground, he had no fear of military aggression by Soviet forces and that
Communism had lost its opportunity to capture Germany.42 In the opinions of the United
States and other Western powers, Berlin had become a symbol of firmness from which no
retreat was possible. The London Agreements and the Blockade of Berlin helped to create
a new image for West Germany, one of integrity, a nation of freedom loving people
holding the front lines against the Soviet aggressors. Despite the new image, the series of
events and failed negotiations that separated East Germany from West Germany did not
come about as an internal dynamic or a choice made by the German people. A separate
West German nation with a separate economic recovery fully integrated onto a
multilateral Western block of nations was an external process decided on by its occupiers,
particularly the US State Department. The roots of this external process can be traced
back to policy generated in 1939 by early postwar planners at the US State Department.
The European Recovery Program and West Germany
Through the influence of ERP funds, the United States was able to compel the
European market into the use of a multilateral commercial system. One main
precondition was that West Germany was to be included. There has been a significant
debate among historians regarding the value of ERP aid to the European recovery. The
41
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inquiry centers on whether internal European trade networks or the external influence and
aid provided by the United States generated economic recovery. The debate often focuses
on who benefited from the aid; the impact of ERP aid was not recognized equally by all
participating nations. Most historians would agree that it was more important to the
recovery of West Germany than to most other European nations. As the dominant
occupier, the United States had direct influence on the West German economy and could
direct its interactions. Whereas it can be debated as to what degree the recovery of
individual European nations was enhanced by the efforts of the United States, the
application of US aid by use of a multilateral approach was critical to the creation of an
interdependent structure of international commerce in Europe and was decisive to the
inclusion of West Germany.
Before the successful return of West German commercial trade to the
international stage, the concerns of other nations had to be addressed. To a great extent,
the perception of a Soviet threat from Eastern Europe went a long way in allowing West
German integration into West European international markets. However, the application
of ERP funds as leverage by the United States was also important in promoting the return
of West Germany. For example, on three different occasions in 1948, European nations
were asked to give both West Germany and Japan most-favored-nation trade status as a
condition of receiving ERP funds.43 This request encountered considerable resistance
from French and British Foreign Service officials and Western European domestic labor
organizations. The United States was eventually able to convince European nations to
concede to most-favored-nation trade status for West Germany, but not for Japan.44 Any
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major industrial economy, like Germany or Japan, even though they had been recent
enemies, would be an important contributor to a global marketplace.
In the immediate postwar period, most European nations intended on paying for
the reconstruction of their economies by increasing their exports. The US State
Department recognized that a shortage of available foreign currency in Europe would
derail these plans. The value of postwar foreign trade varied from nation to nation. In
1949, the trade/ per-capita as a percentage of national income was in 71.3%Belgium,
30.3% in France, and 39.4% in Britain.45 Nations like France and Britain could
conceivably establish their own national economies first and later negotiate a more
beneficial trade deal. Other European nations like Germany, Belgium, and the
Netherlands were in an immediate need to reestablish a trade network. Perhaps the most
significant aspect of the ERP was the financial capability given to West German allowing
it to participate in the international commercial market.46 In mid-1949, the Organization
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the successor organization to the CEEC,
was set up by seventeen nations to allocate ERP funds and administer policy decisions.
They immediately began to promote trade deals and make tariff reductions that affected
50% of all European trade. However, the solution to the problem involved more than just
reducing tariffs. Before full implementation of tariff restrictions could occur, nations had
to resolve their balance of payments problems. With so many countries looking to
dramatically increase exports, there was no viable mechanism by which international
payment settlements could be balanced other than returning to highly restrictive bilateral
trade agreements. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 addressed this issue, but its
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scope was too small to fix the problem. Large balance of payment discrepancies persisted
through the end of the decade. ERP funds proved to be crucial. By providing currency in
the form of dollars necessary to pay for imports, the United States helped generate a
multilateral trade in the seventeen participants as a whole.47 This environment of
expanding exports helped to create prosperity among the participating nations and pushed
ERP participants to eventually develop a model of European economic integration similar
to what had been proposed by early postwar planners at the US State Department.
The forceful position of the United States as a sponsor was a key component of
West Germany reacceptance to the community of nations. This process was facilitated in
a number of ways. The United States insisting that West Germany become a member of
the OEEC was a factor in creating the preconditions that allowed Germany’s return to the
world economy.48 West Germany’s neighbors had concerns about a powerful and
independent West Germany eventually dominating the market.49 To resolve these
objections, the US State Department was successful in formulating a policy by which the
recourses from the Ruhr could be used as a basis for an exchange of trade that would
benefit other Western nations. The United States also solved other problems that could
have hindered the acceptance of a West Germany state by its European neighbors. The
ERP resolved the reparations problem for Western Europe by providing a financial
alternative to receiving German reparation payments. The United States provided the
political framework for West Germany to develop as a stable democratic state. Perhaps
most importantly, the combined effect of these factors led to the removal of economic
uncertainty. West German participation under the direct supervision of the United States
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led to political, economic, and military stability; the value of these conditions to the
development of an international commercial system cannot be underestimated. By
securing the division of Germany, the United States was successful in creating a West
German safe zone suitable for its inclusion in a multilateral commercial system that was
closely tied to Western capitalist ideals. A secure and capitalist West Germany was a
better outcome than the uncertainty of never-ending negotiations with the Soviets over a
united Germany. The US State Department policy set the stage for a powerful industrial
nation centrally located on the European continent to fully participate in a future
capitalist world market without concerns for past German notions, like lebensraum,
autarchy, or beggar-thy-neighbor policies, or new concerns over communist infiltration.
From this point forward, a powerful German industrial economy could be safely
reconnected within the European community of nations with the purpose of producing
international prosperity.
The application of the ERP to the particular region of Europe was important.
Europe, unlike other parts of the world, was capable of sustaining a higher level of
multilateral exchange and had a long history of industrial production.50 The United States
was not interested in a New Deal program for the world, but aid given to redevelop
Europe would pay off in the long run for the US economy. The industrial nature of both
the European and American economies meant that both of their fates were tied together.
In a speech given in 1947, Marshall expressed his ideas about a special connection
between the United States and Europe. The United States does not want to fill the
European vacuum with American, Soviet, or even German power. Europe must be a
community of nations, not dominated by a single power. It is the divergence of interest
50
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over the condition of Europe that causes the difference between the Soviets and the
United States. Marshall clearly defined the Soviets as an opponent of economic recovery
while the United States was promoting prosperity.51 Marshall went on about the
important position of Europe. The enlightened interests of the Unites States coincides
with the best interests of Europe. Europe is an advance civilization of which the United
States is a part; the United States’ national traditions have their foundation in Europe.
The USSR does not share this purpose; if the USSR prevails, a prosperous Europe cannot
be reestablished. Marshall states, “The logic of history would appear to dictate the
necessity of this community, drawing closer together not only for its own survival, but for
the stability, prosperity, and peace of the entire world.”52
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Conclusion

The West German economy came to thrive in the post-WWII era. By 1950, West
Germany had returned to the world market with a vengeance. The 1945 to 1950 period of
transformation coincided with the full force of the US occupation and was marked by a
number of dramatic changes to the organization of both the German and European
economies. These changes were initiated by a policy in which its roots can be traced back
to the early postwar planning done in 1939 by US State Department officials and their
partners at the Council of Foreign Relations. The United States contributed to the
establishment of a European wide system of prosperity based on a multilateral trade that
included the West German industrial economy as a central player. This course of events
went against the natural impulse of nations to reintroduce economic nationalism in the
postwar period. During the first half of the twentieth century, Europe became
increasingly nationalistic. During the post-WWII occupation period, this trend was
starting to reverse. To encourage economic prosperity, the United States expected
European nations to surrender a portion of their economic sovereignty for all trading
partners to benefit from a mutual prosperity with the expectation that this would lead to
peace.
There were other dramatic changes that occurred during the occupational period
that can be attributed to US foreign policy to some extent. In 1948, Germany transitioned
from a planned economy to a liberal economy. Germany, more than any other industrial
nation, had a history of planned economies. Germany’s; the nation’s natural bent toward
order and organization predisposed Germany in favor of control. In 1948, the choice to
change course was not without significance. The transition to free markets was not
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completed in 1948, but the general trend was established. US policy deserves
considerable credit for Germany taking the first steps toward market liberalization, a
trend that was gradually accepted and eventually intensified by German industry.
The United States played a major role in the division of Germany. As a result, the
United States can accept credit for advancing the economic prosperity in Western
Europe, but the burden of the Cold War animosity fell heavy on both the European
continent and the US taxpayer. It is ironic that US State Department officials who were
the most opposed to partition before 1947 were, in the end, the officials most responsible
for the division of Germany. There is a remote possibility that full cooperation with the
Soviets from the start of the occupation might have unified Germany, but the State
Department would have had to give up on its multilateral doctrine. A postwar
international commercial system of trade under a Soviet dominated Europe would not
have been much better than an international trading system under a German fascist
dominated Europe.
West Germany became an essential part of European economic success. The
international free trade order pursued by the United States in the postwar period benefited
a German industrial base whose potential productive capacity was ready to restart. As an
exporter of producer goods, it stood to gain from a freer international movement of
capital goods. As a by-product of economic recovery came the possibility of a remade
culture image through the representation of a powerful German entrepreneurial economy,
West Germans could put aside the shadows of the recent past to develop a new cultural
image based on economic success and prosperity, a national redemption embodied in a
new commercial spirit. This was at the heart of what early postwar planners at the US
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State Department had envisaged—a change in the German psyche based on using an
economic process to effect cultural change and to produce a wholesome democratic
psychology that would be compatible with the American notion of international
commerce.
There is no doubt that there was a dramatic change in attitude of the United States
during the post-WWII period toward an increased involvement in international affairs.
The United States reversed its prewar isolationism and advanced a proactive foreign
policy. It now seems clear that US isolationism during the interwar period was
detrimental to peace and prosperity of the world and that US leadership during the
postwar era was both beneficial and stabilizing. Most historians recognize this change in
attitude, but still debate to what extent US foreign policy can claim responsibility for the
return of European prosperity. There was no question in the mind of Clay and nearly all
US officials present during the occupation that the ERP saved the free nations of Europe.
Still, historians like Alan Milward argue that US policy like the ERP and Bretton Woods
Agreements had little effect on European economic recovery. Whether the ERP or the
Bretton Woods Agreements were individually successful in lifting the economies of
individual European nations misses the point. During the post-1945 period, the United
States, the world’s most powerful economic engine, became fully engaged in the
promotion of a multilateral European prosperity. Whether a particular program or
agreement succeeded in the recovery of an individual country pales in respect to the
overall success of US foreign policy to partner with a grouping of European nations to
create a functional international commercial market.
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In 1947, the multilateral economic system proposed by the early postwar planners
at the US State Department was confronting an increasingly antagonistic Soviet force in
Germany. The solution of this dilemma became a defining moment in the start of the
Cold War. The only viable option for the United States was to separate a multilateral
West Germany from a Soviet dominated East Germany. This division ensured that a
group of Western capitalist nations could rebuild a prosperous international economy
through economic cooperation. The Marxist theory of imperialism contends that capitalist
nations will continually start wars with other capitalists over the expanding forces of
imperialism. Stalin believed that this was a root cause of WWII and that it was just a
matter of time before capitalist nations would once again start an international conflict.
Officials at the US State Department had a different outlook for the possibility of
cooperation among capitalist nations. They believed that capitalist nations could
cooperate to generate prosperity under the guise of free trade and market liberalization. A
close examination of the post-WWII Europe makes it clear that under an environment of
international cooperation capitalist, nations can work together to create international
economic prosperity.
What became of postwar West Germany was considered by most to be a
remarkable success—the growth of a powerful and prosperous economy, a stable
democracy, an integrated part of a larger European market, and a proponent for world
peace and security. The long-term planning and diplomatic efforts made by the US State
Department to include postwar Germany in an egalitarian multilateral international
market must be considered as a key factor in this outcome.
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